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Abstract 
A methodology is proposed for constructing a price index that reflects the 
change in the prices of the goods and services purchased by medical 
schemes in South Africa. The methodological choices were made taking 
cognisance of the unique characteristics of the South African medical 
scheme environment, both in terms of the factors influencing the mix of 
goods and services purchased by medical schemes, as well as the factors 
affecting price determination. 
An example of a pharmaceutical price index was constructed to 
illustrate the proposed methodology, the results of which are presented. 
Whilst the proposed methodology provides a base for creating a 
meaningful and useful medical scheme price index there is considerable 
further work that needs to be done to refine the methodology. 
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Chapter 1 
1. Introduction 
In the 2006/7 fiscal year, health sector expenditure in South Africa made 
up 8.4% of GDP (Blecher, Day, Dove, & Cairns, 2008). Most (58.1%) of this 
expenditure occurred in the private sector (Blecher, et al., 2008), where 
medical schemes act as the primary financing intermediaries by collecting 
contributions, pooling these contributions and purchasing medical goods 
and services. In 2008 there were 7.88 million beneficiaries covered by 
medical schemes, representing 15.84% of the population (Council for 
Medical Schemes, 2009a, 2009b; Statistics South Africa, 2008b) .  
Medical schemes are tax-exempt, not-for-profit entities. They 
purchase medical goods and services in the private sector (i.e. from 
private practitioners and private hospitals), and thus have an interest in 
the rate of change in the prices of private medical goods and services. 
However, there is no commonly-accepted measure of the rate of change 
in these prices (Da Silva, 2007). Medical schemes also purchase non-
medical goods and services, such as third-party administration services, in 
the course of acting as financing intermediaries. Medical scheme 
expenditure on both medical and non-medical goods and services 
exceeded R68 billion in 2008 (Council for Medical Schemes, 2009a).    
Members of medical schemes pay monthly contributions to the 
scheme, on their own behalf as well as on behalf of their dependants.  
Medical schemes are subject to ‘community rating’ (where contributions 
are allowed to vary only by family size, family structure, in terms of adult 
and child dependants, and income and not by risk factors such as age and 
health status), resulting in relatively simple contribution tables.  
Differences arise between the changes in the price of medical scheme 
cover, as experienced by the consumer, and the changes in the prices of 
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goods and services experienced by medical schemes. This is because 
medical scheme contributions are affected by factors other than the price 
of the goods and services they purchase, which include changes in the 
benefits offered, changes in the consumption of medical goods and 
services, changes in quality of care, changes in beneficiary demographics, 
and changes in solvency margins (Berndt, et al., 2000; Da Silva, 2007). The 
real price of medical scheme cover near-doubled between 1994 and 2005 
(McLeod & Ramjee, 2007), and since 2005 average medical scheme 
contributions have consistently increased at a rate higher than CPIX 
(Council for Medical Schemes, 2009a).  
This research considers the issues affecting the construction of a price 
index and proposes a method for constructing an index to monitor the 
changes in prices of goods and services purchased by medical schemes. 
Application of the method is demonstrated through the construction of a 
medical scheme price index for pharmaceutical products based on 
historical data (for the time period 2006 to 2009) obtained from a medical 
scheme administrator. 
The development of the index methodology is dependent on the 
targeted users of the index, in this case medical schemes and their boards 
of trustees. There are, however, other potential users of the index, 
including parties with whom medical schemes contract, such as medical 
scheme administrators, managed care companies and medical providers. 
The regulator (the Council for Medical Schemes) and the national 
statistical agency (Statistics South Africa) are also likely to have an interest 
in such an index, as is the National Department of Health (DoH). Given 
that medical scheme contributions are partially tax-deductible, National 
Treasury and the South African Revenue Service are also likely to be 
interested in the factors affecting medical scheme contributions over 
time. 
The intention of the proposed price index is to enable a clearer 
understanding of price changes in both medical and non-medical items of 
expenditure as experienced by medical schemes. Whilst medical scheme 
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administrators frequently provide trustees with data on changes in 
expenditure, these calculations usually conflate price changes with 
changes in the mix of goods and services utilised. An index based on a 
published and accepted methodology would provide trustees with 
additional information and assist in decision making. 
The medical component of the official consumer price index (published 
by Statistics South Africa) is not appropriate for this purpose as it is 
constructed from a consumer perspective, and represents both covered 
and uncovered people. The mix of goods and services demanded by those 
who are covered by medical schemes is likely to differ considerably from 
that demanded by those who are not, due to differences in access to 
medical care arising from inter alia affordability differences, geographical 
differences, differences in the burden of disease and medical scheme 
benefit design (Newhouse, 2001).  Medical schemes enable risk pooling 
and pre-payment, both of which enhance consumer access to private 
medical care, particularly that relating to high-cost events.   
The medical scheme industry is represented in the official consumer 
price index (CPI) only to the extent that medical scheme contributions 
form part of the basket of goods and services covered by that index, 
although medical scheme data are used extensively to inform the other 
health components of CPI. 
The experience gained in constructing indices for the medical scheme 
industry could be used to inform the construction of the consumer 
medical price index both in terms of available data and from a 
methodological perspective. As the consumer medical price index forms 
part of the economy-wide consumer price index, biases in the medical 
price index will lead to biases in the overall price index, particularly as 
medical care is a large and growing part of the economy (Newhouse, 
2001). It is thus important to understand and minimise such biases.  
For medical schemes, being able to separate out price changes from 
changes in overall expenditure will allow a clearer understanding of non-
price-related changes in expenditure. Of particular importance to schemes 
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from a risk management perspective are the effects of changes in benefit 
utilisation and changes in demographic profile on scheme expenditure (Da 
Silva, 2007). Similarly, managed care companies need to separate out 
changes in expenditure so as to be able to demonstrate savings generated, 
which may arise from effective utilisation management or from managed 
care interventions directed at reducing prices. In this regard, a series of 
detailed sub-indices are particularly useful. The possibility of recalculating 
the indices based on the scheme’s own weights, and not industry weights, 
would also assist with risk management decisions.  
Escalation clauses in contracts, such as negotiated fee schedules, may 
be based on the medical component of the price index (Da Silva, 2007). 
The availability of an accurate price index also fosters longer-term 
contracting between medical schemes and providers. The medical 
component of the index is also of interest to a possible Risk Equalisation 
Fund as the published tables need to be adjusted annually to reflect price 
changes.  The non-medical component could be used in negotiations with 
the suppliers of non-medical goods and services, such as medical scheme 
administrators.   
Policymakers use medical price indices to assess the impact of changes 
in public policy and to inform future policy decisions, such as the need for 
price controls (Newhouse, 2001). In the South African context, both 
medical schemes and the regulator will have an interest in measuring the 
impact of regulatory changes, such as the medicine pricing regulations.  
The indices can also be used to inform possible future regulation; recent 
areas of scrutiny include private hospital costs and non-medical costs, 
such as administration fees. 
South Africa is in the process of moving towards a system of National 
Health Insurance (NHI) and the future of medical schemes in this new 
paradigm is unclear. The proposed index methodology would need to be 
revised to reflect the expenditure patterns of the funding entity or entities 
that may replace the current medical scheme structures. However, much 
of the underlying rationale for such an index will remain unchanged. If 
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anything, the pressure on a National Health Insurance Authority to 
effectively manage its expenditure will be greater than the current 
pressure on medical schemes, increasing the importance of a relevant and 
representative price index. 
The major limitation of the research is that the proposed methodology 
was not tested on a complete dataset. The application of the index was 
confined to pharmaceutical products; expenditure on these products 
made up 13.4% of medical scheme expenditure in 2008 (Council for 
Medical Schemes, 2009a). The application was based on data from a 
medical scheme administrator, representing 12.4% of the medical scheme 
industry (Council for Medical Schemes, 2009a). As a consequence the data 
are not necessarily representative of the medical scheme industry. This is 
of lesser consequence for a pharmaceutical product price index than for 
other categories of expenditure because, due to the regulation of 
pharmaceutical prices, price changes are not likely to vary considerably 
between schemes.  
Chapter 2 is a survey of international and South African literature on 
the general theory of index construction and the health economics theory 
relating to the interpretation of medical price indices. The South African 
literature on the factors affecting the goods and services purchased by 
medical schemes is discussed in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 discusses the South 
African literature on the factors affecting price determination for medical 
schemes, such as pricing structure and price regulation. The proposed 
index methodology is outlined in Chapter 5, together with a discussion of 
available data. Chapter 6 presents the results of an application of the 
proposed methodology to pharmaceutical data. Chapter 7 discusses the 
results obtained and presents suggestions for further research.   
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Chapter 2 
2. Literature Review – General Theory 
The theory of index numbers can be approached both from the 
perspective of the field of official statistics and from an economic 
perspective, where the statistical perspective relates largely to index 
construction, including the determination of the basket of goods and 
services, how to measure prices, how these prices should be aggregated, 
the time span the index should cover and the intervals at which it should 
be calculated. The economic perspective, on the other hand, focuses on 
the interpretation of the numbers, particularly the relationship between 
price change and economic welfare.  
2.1. Defining price indices 
Index numbers are single numbers used to summarise key features of a 
set of variables.  A price index is an index number that reflects the relative 
price levels over time, and can be used to separate a change in total 
expenditure into price changes and quantity changes (ILO, et al., 2004).  
Prices are influenced by both general factors (that affect all goods and 
services of interest) and specific factors (affecting particular items).  
Averaging the price changes of a basket of goods and services allows the 
effect of the item-specific factors to be reduced (Crowe, 1965), providing 
an indicator of the general change in the level of prices. 
A price index requires a precise definition of the goods and services to 
be included, based both on the needs of the targeted end-users and the 
stated purpose of the index. The way in which an index is defined and 
constructed will determine the potential uses of that index. For example, 
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consumer price indices reflect the rate of price inflation as experienced by 
households and thus have a wide range of applications including informing 
monetary and fiscal policy, the indexing of wages, taxes, transfers and 
social security benefits, and measuring change in real output and 
productivity (Newhouse, 2001).  
Indices that represent a sub-section of the economy will have more 
limited applications. Typically a reliable price index for a particular sector 
would allow the real change in output of that sector to be measured, 
enabling the productivity levels and economic growth of that sector to be 
evaluated, and consequently enabling the assessment of structural 
changes in the sector (Newhouse, 2001). In the medical sector this is 
complicated by the difficulties associated with measuring the output of 
the sector. This is because consumers do not value the medical goods and 
services they are purchasing per se; they value the resulting health 
outcomes. Health economists argue that medical care produces health 
and health produces utility (Berndt, et al., 2001).   
Berndt, et al (2001) argue that measuring the output of the medical 
care sector in terms of health status is complicated because changes in 
health status are affected by numerous factors other than medical care 
including changing demographics of the population (e.g. age), changing 
disease incidence, changing environmental factors (such as the climate, 
pollution and violence) and changes in lifestyle.  In addition, behavioural 
factors such as diet, smoking, exercise and the pursuit of risky behaviour 
are all aspects of the consumer’s lifestyle that impact on health.  As 
medical care is only one of a number of factors that impacts on health, the 
output from the medical sector cannot be measured in terms of the 
average health of the population. The output of the sector can be “viewed 
in marginal terms as the health implication of a medical intervention, 
conditional on lifestyle, environment and other inputs affecting health”  
(Berndt, et al., 2001, p.149).   
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2.2. Interpreting price indices 
Price indices are often interpreted as representing a change in the cost of 
living, and in this context “index numbers are essentially devices for 
converting information about changes in flows of goods or money into 
some sort of measure of changes in welfare” (Marris, 1958, p. 185). This 
involves introducing the idea of utility or satisfaction because the change 
in the cost of living from one period to another is related to the increase in 
the amount of money required to maintain a certain reference level of 
utility (Konüs, 1939). A cost-of-living index also involves measuring quality 
adjusted prices, as quality changes impact on utility (Marris, 1958). This 
economic interpretation of price indices is often incorrect; the validity of 
the interpretation will depend on the form of the index (discussed in 
section 2.4), the factors influencing prices and the extent to which changes 
in quality are adjusted for.   
The cost-of-living interpretation is clearly not valid when an index 
represents only a sub-section of the market of available goods and 
services, as is the case with this research. However, this does not obviate 
the need to understand the extent to which the assumptions necessary for 
a cost-of-living index hold. It remains necessary to understand the 
limitations on the interpretation of the index and the extent to which the 
sub-index can inform an economy-wide index.  
The theory relating to cost-of-living indices assumes that the prices 
paid for goods and services reflect the underlying preferences of 
consumers, which in turn assumes consumer optimisation and efficiency 
in the purchase of goods and service. Whilst these assumptions may not 
hold true for other sectors of the economy, they are particularly 
problematic for the medical care sector. Berndt et al. (2001, p.146) argue 
that “revealed consumer purchases are not a reliable guide to the 
marginal value of medical care” because consumer behaviour takes place 
in the context of asymmetric information and imperfect agency 
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relationships. The presence of third party payers such as medical schemes 
further distorts the interpretation of price indices.  
Patients, medical practitioners and medical schemes are in a three-
way principal-agent relationship. Cutler & Zeckhauser (1999) argue that in 
addition to medical practitioners acting as agents (in that they make 
resource-spending decisions on behalf of both patients and medical 
schemes), financing intermediaries impact on the relationship between 
patients and providers, both from the demand-side (e.g. patient co-
payments) and the supply-side (e.g. how providers are reimbursed).  
The medical practitioner plays a dual role: advising the patient on the 
appropriate treatment and providing that treatment. A misalignment of 
the interests of the provider and the patient would result in an imperfect 
agency relationship (McGuire, 2000), allowing the provider to influence 
the demand for services to take advantage of payment arrangements.  
Depending on the payment arrangement in place this may either result in 
supplier-induced demand or under-servicing (Giled & Remler, 2002). 
The agency relationship between the patient and provider is affected 
by the information asymmetry that exists between them. Medical 
practitioners are better informed than patients about the range of 
possible treatments, the costs of treatment and the potential outcomes of 
treatment (Cutler & Zeckhauser, 1999). It is possible for neither the 
practitioner nor the patient to have the information required to make 
optimal decisions (Giled & Remler, 2002). The consumer’s ability to make 
rational choices is further affected by the need to make decisions in the 
face of life-threatening or emergency situations (Hsiao, 1995).  
In the context of health insurance (or medical scheme coverage), the 
term moral hazard refers to the way in which consumers behave when 
they do not have to pay for medical care themselves, and does not 
necessarily imply some sort of moral failing on the part of the insured.  
Moral hazard presents itself in two forms: firstly, that individuals take 
more risks knowing that they are insured and secondly, that individuals 
will use more goods or services (or more expensive goods or services) than 
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if they were paying for them themselves. Cutler & Zeckhauser (1999) 
argue that the first form is of less significance because health coverage 
cannot fully compensate for a loss of health. The second form arises 
because people are insulated from the true costs of health care and 
because the medical scheme cannot determine the optimal expenditure 
for each person.  
The presence of a third-party payer causes the marginal private costs 
and the marginal social costs of medical care to diverge.  It has the effect 
of reducing the price of medical care for the individual, resulting in an 
increase in demand to a point where the marginal social cost exceeds the 
marginal benefit (Hsiao, 1995). The result is that the observed prices for 
medical care are not an accurate reflection of the value placed on 
improvements in health.   
The medical sector has experienced and will continue to experience 
organisational change in terms of how services are reimbursed (e.g. 
moving from fee-for-service remuneration to capitation). Changes in 
reimbursement mechanisms alter provider incentives which in turn may 
alter the demand for services. Managed care has increased the extent of 
clinical rationing present in the medical market place and has changed the 
way in which health care is rationed. Rationing mechanisms act as 
constraints and thus make it more difficult to assess the consumer’s 
willingness to pay, which impacts on the extent to which observable 
purchases are an accurate reflection of consumer welfare (Berndt, et al., 
2000).  
Another characteristic of the medical sector is the rapid pace of 
technological change both in terms of quality improvements and entirely 
new goods and services. Making explicit adjustments for these changes 
requires estimating the value of the changes on health outcomes; not 
adjusting for quality can lead to significant overstatements in the cost of 
living (Newhouse, 2001). Assumptions need to be made about the 
monetary worth of health improvements, which is further complicated 
because there is more than one treatment response that requires 
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measurement including mortality, morbidity, pain and suffering, 
functional and emotional impairment and quality of life (Berndt, et al., 
2000). It is also difficult to separate the effect of medical care on these 
treatment responses from various other social, environmental and 
behavioural factors.   
The relationship between medical care, health and utility is further 
complicated because factors like lifestyle and time are not only inputs in 
the production of health, but also have a direct impact on utility, and 
because the current consumption of medical goods and services may 
impact future health as well as future consumption patterns (Berndt, et 
al., 2000). 
Quality changes arise from a number of sources and are not limited to 
the introduction of new goods or services.  For example, organisational 
change in medical practices may result in qualitative changes in the supply 
of treatment and the patient’s experience of medical care (Berndt, et al., 
2000).  Such changes in the qualitative aspects of care impact on 
consumer utility but are difficult to allow for in a medical price index.  
Quality change can also occur as medical knowledge improves, for 
example, where the outcome of a procedure improves over time as 
surgeons learn by doing (Newhouse, 2001). 
Inefficiencies exist in the production of medical care, aspects of which 
include the overuse of medical services, the underuse of medical services 
and medical error, for example, the use of an inappropriate setting for 
care or patients getting the incorrect medication (Newhouse, 2001).  
Constructing a cost-of-living index assumes that all production is optimal 
and there is thus no allowance for changes in efficiency that take place 
over time and the resultant impact on health outcomes (Newhouse, 
2001).  
The efficiency of the production of medical care depends on the 
efforts of both the medical practitioner (supplier) and the patient, for 
example, health outcomes are affected by the knowledge of the provider 
as well as the knowledge of the patient and producing better health 
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requires time from both providers as well as consumers (Berndt, et al., 
2000). The extent of production inefficiencies will also depend on the 
extent of managed care intervention, the existence of treatment 
guidelines, the pace of technological change and the financing 
mechanisms in place (e.g. the effect of third party payers on overuse)  
(Cutler & Berndt, 2001; Newhouse, 2001).  
2.3. Important characteristics of price indices 
A good index should fairly represent the general trend in prices. It is 
desirable that a price index be accurate, simple and intelligible; the 
accuracy of an index depends on the choice of formula, the sample size, 
the sampling methodology and the quality of the original data (Fisher, 
1927). Errors in the data may arise from the markets used, the sources of 
price quotations or the agency collecting the data (Fisher, 1927).  
There are practical constraints on index construction, primarily relating 
to data availability, collection and processing. Constructing a price index is 
complicated by the vast number of goods and services available and the 
rapid pace of change: there are new goods and services being introduced 
on an ongoing basis as well as changes being made to existing goods and 
services (Boskin, Dulberger, Gordon, Griliches, & Jorgenson, 1998). The 
relative prices of goods and services change frequently as do buying 
patterns (Boskin, et al., 1998). Resource constraints may affect the 
frequency with which data can be collected and processed which in turn 
affects the usefulness of the index which, ideally, should be published 
frequently and be made available timeously (ILO, et al., 2004).    
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2.4. Choice of an index formula 
Index numbers are assigned a value of one or 100 at a base date (referred 
to as the index reference period), and all price changes are expressed 
relative to this reference period (denoted period 0).  Index numbers can 
be calculated as “a ratio between two weighted averages of two different 
sets of values of the same set of variables, using the same set of weights 
for both” (Marris, 1958, p.209). More specifically, a price index can be 
calculated as the percentage change in the value of an aggregate, holding 
the quantities constant (ILO, et al., 2004).  
The general form of such a fixed-basket index is referred to as a Lowe 
index, denoted, for our purposes, PLo (Lowe, 1823, as cited in ILO, et al., 
2004). The weight reference period, denoted period b, and the price 
reference period are differentiated from each other. In the construction of 
consumer price indices, the weights are usually determined from a 
household expenditure survey.  The weight reference period thus often 
pre-dates the price reference period due to the time-consuming nature of 
collecting and processing the data (ILO, et al., 2004). Thus, 
 
        
  
Where 
t is the current time period  
 is the price of item i in time period x and  
 is the quantity of item i in time period x. 
 
Alternatively, a price index can also be calculated by calculating price 
changes for each item in the basket of goods and averaging them; the 
items are then weighted according to the proportion of total expenditure 
they represent (ILO, et al., 2004). The price movements are referred to as 
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price relatives: the ratio of the price of a single item at a second point in 
time to the price of the same item at an earlier point in time (ILO, et al., 
2004). The two approaches are mathematically identical if the same 
assumptions are made.  
The Lowe formula can be restated in price relative form as follows: 
 
       
           
where the expenditure share takes the following form: 
 
 . 
           
This second approach can be thought of as taking the average of ratios 
(the price relative approach), as opposed to the ratio of averages (the 
aggregate approach).  The price relative approach is particularly useful 
where various sub-indices are required or where the effect of a change in 
one constituent needs to be analysed (Crowe, 1965). 
Either way, a price index is simply a weighted average. The choices of 
possible formulae thus depend on the method of averaging and the 
possible choices of weights. Due to the forces of supply and demand 
(amongst other factors) the pattern of relative quantities of goods and 
services consumed changes over time. There is thus more than one 
possibility for the choice of weights for a price index, ranging from the 
pattern of consumption pre-dating the period of comparison to the 
pattern of consumption at the end of the period of comparison.   
There are special cases of the Lowe formula that are discussed 
extensively in the literature: the Laspeyres formula, denoted here as PL 
(Laspeyres, 1871, as cited in ILO, et al., 2004) is where b=0 and the 
Paasche formula, denoted here as PP (Paasche, 1874, as cited in ILO, et al., 
2004) is where b=t. The Laspeyres formula can be stated in either 
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aggregate form (Equation 2.1) or price relative form (Equation 2.2).  
Similarly the aggregate version of the Paasche formula (Equation 2.3) has 
a price relative equivalent (Equation 2.4), in this case a weighted harmonic 
average. These formulae are as follows: 
 
          (2.1) 
 
          (2.2) 
 
           (2.3) 
 
         (2.4). 
 
The Young index, denoted here as PY, is similar to a Lowe index, the 
only difference being the expenditure shares are kept constant and not 
the quantities consumed. In a Lowe index the quantities from period b 
(which pre-dates period 0) are multiplied by the prices from time 0. In a 
Young index the expenditure shares are assumed to remain constant from 
time b to time 0 and are thus not updated. The formula takes the 
following form:  
 
       
           
where the expenditure share takes the following form: 
 
 .         
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There exists another class of formulae referred to as “symmetric 
indices”.  These formulae make symmetrical use of both price and 
quantity data in the two time periods being compared.  The three 
formulae commonly used are the Fisher index, denoted here as PF, the 
Walsh index, denoted here as PW, and the Törnqvist index, denoted here 
as PT. These three formulae are: 
 
        
  
 
        
  
and  
 
 
where 
 
 .        
  
There are two key approaches to the selection of a formula: the so-
called axiomatic approach and the economic approach. The axiomatic 
approach was pioneered by Irving Fisher (1927). He assessed the formulae 
purely from a mathematical perspective, where price and quantity were 
treated as independent variables. In the axiomatic approach Fisher runs 
various tests on alternative index formulae in order to evaluate them. 
In applying the axiomatic approach it is important to understand the 
relative importance of the tests, that is, it is more important to know 
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which tests are failed than merely the number of tests failed. It is also 
important to know the extent to which the various tests do not hold. (ILO, 
et al., 2004) 
The two most important tests used to assess whether various formulae 
produce consistent results or not are the “Time Reversal Test” and the 
“Factor Reversal Test”. The Time Reversal Test assesses whether the 
formula produces consistent results when it is applied from the base year 
to the current year and when it is applied from the current year to the 
base year. If this is the case the two results multiplied together will yield 
an answer of one, that is, the price index calculated going forward in time 
should be the reciprocal of that calculated going backward in time. This 
relationship holds for any individual item in the basket and should thus, 
ideally, hold for the basket of items (Fisher, 1927).  
The Factor Reversal Test checks whether the formula accurately 
partitions increases in total expenditure into price increases and quantity 
increases, that is, whether the price index multiplied by the quantity index 
yields the increase in value (which is unambiguous) (Fisher, 1927).  Again, 
this holds true for any individual item and should thus, ideally, hold for the 
basket of items. 
Fisher (1927) assessed various price-relative formulae using these two 
tests and found that there was bias caused both by the type of average 
used and by the weighting system used, and that the greater the 
dispersion of the price relatives, the greater the bias. The arithmetic 
average was found to be biased upward as the product of the formula 
forward in time multiplied by the formula backward in time is greater than 
1.  Similarly, the harmonic average is biased downward. Formulae using 
base-period weights produce downward bias as they give too much weight 
to small price relatives and, similarly, formulae using current-year weights 
are biased upward as they give too much weight to large price relatives.   
Neither the Laspeyres nor the Paasche formulae fulfil either the Time 
Reversal Test or the Factor Reversal Test.  However, the biases that arise 
because these axioms do not hold are offsetting; the Laspeyres formula is 
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a base-period weighted arithmetic average and the Paasche formula is a 
current-period weighted harmonic average.  Both the Laspeyres and 
Paasche formulae have been found to be only slightly erratic and thus 
preferable to many of the other candidate formulae (Fisher, 1927).  
The symmetric indices also stand up well to the axiomatic approach.  
The ideal index, from a mathematical perspective, was found to be the 
Fisher index (Fisher, 1927). 
The economic perspective involves selecting a formula that best 
approximates a cost-of-living index, i.e. a formula that captures shifts in 
consumption in response to price changes. The Fisher, Walsh and 
Törnqvist formulae are referred to as “superlative” index formulae in 
economic literature because these formulae are found to be equal to cost-
of-living indices that assume particular forms of indifference curves (ILO, 
et al., 2004).   
The Laspeyres index assumes a “rigid quantitative pattern of 
consumption” (Marris, 1958, p.244) in that it does not allow for shifts in 
supply and demand in response to price increases. The Laspeyres index 
tends to overstate the overall increase in prices because consumers tend 
to substitute items that have had lower price increases for those that have 
had higher price increases. This substitution bias is often referred to as the 
Laspeyres bias, and the extent of the bias will depend on the price 
elasticity of demand and the extent to which substitutes are available. In 
this situation the Paasche index will understate the overall increase in 
price as the weights will reflect the shift towards the items that 
experienced the lowest price increases. It exaggerates the effect of savings 
that can be generated through substitution.  
The relationship between Paasche and Laspeyres depends on the 
relationship between price and quantity movements, which are affected 
by the demand effects described above as well as supply-side effects. 
Large differences between the Laspeyres and Paasche price index 
numbers will arise if the weights in the two time periods are significantly 
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different and if there is a relationship between changes in price and 
changes in the quantities purchased (Marris, 1958).   
The common use of the Laspeyres formula is largely driven by a lack of 
availability of current expenditure data. In addition, the idea of a fixed 
basket of goods preserves continuity (Newhouse, 2001). However, as 
consumer preferences and conditions change over time the items selected 
for the basket become less representative and the relative importance of 
items also changes (Newhouse, 2001). This necessitates updating the 
basket from time to time to avoid the index becoming irrelevant. A change 
in the weights from time to time will require the series before the change 
and the series after the change to be linked (ILO, et al., 2004). The 
relevance of the basket thus depends on the frequency of re-weighting.  
However, frequent re-weighting may not be practical as it requires a 
survey of spending patterns which may be time-consuming and expensive 
(ILO, et al., 2004).  
In a chain-linked system, the index number for each period is first 
calculated relative to the preceding period and then multiplied by all the 
preceding links back to the base period. Any index formula can be used for 
the individual links, including an index formula where expenditure weights 
pre-date the price reference period. The chain-linking methodology is 
theoretically correct only for comparing any two successive periods 
because of the changes in weightings over time. The chain system is 
subject to cumulative error as a bias introduced in any period will be 
carried forward. This “path-dependence” means that chain-linking should 
not be used where prices oscillate, but only where prices change roughly 
monotonically (ILO, et al., 2004).  
Boskin et al. (1998) advocate the use of formulae that require updated 
quantities. In particular the symmetric (superlative) indices have the 
advantage of being compromise formulae between base-period weights 
and current-period weights. They do, however, recognise that in addition 
to the need for accuracy there is also a need for timeliness and that these 
two requirements conflict because constructing a more accurate (or 
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theoretically correct) index requires time to collect more up-to-date 
information. 
2.5. Sampling considerations 
The vast number of goods and services available, together with limitations 
on data availability, often make it necessary for a price index to be based 
on a representative sample of goods. The sampling methodology and 
sample size greatly affect the accuracy of the index and the choices made 
will influence whether the items in the basket are representative, relevant 
and reflect the primary purpose of the index (Crowe, 1965).  
The sample of goods and services to be included in the basket is 
usually determined using an expenditure survey. The entities surveyed 
would be those whose expenditure the survey represents, for example, for 
a consumer price index one would conduct a household expenditure 
survey. The selection of entities to include in the survey also requires a 
sampling methodology, and requires that a weight be ascribed to each 
entity. In the so-called democratic approach all entities are treated as 
equal, as opposed to the so-called plutocratic approach where each entity 
is weighted according to its level of expenditure. Differences between the 
two approaches will depend on the extent to which different entities face 
different prices (ILO, et al., 2004).  
If prices are to be obtained from outlets (that is, providers) and not 
from the purchasers, a sampling methodology is also required to select 
those from which to obtain price quotations. The American Bureau of 
Labour Statistics conducts a point-of-purchase survey where the 
probability of outlet selection is based on consumer expenditure; price 
changes are calculated as they occur within outlets and no substitution 
between outlets is allowed for (Boskin, et al., 1998).   
This is estimated to create an upward bias in the American CPI 
calculation due to retailing trends which have resulted in consumers 
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switching from higher-cost to lower-cost outlets (Boskin, et al., 1998). This 
is less of an issue if price differences between providers reflect differences 
in quality, for example, lower-cost medical providers may have longer 
waiting times, shorter consultation times and less comfortable 
surroundings. In the medical scheme context price data can be obtained 
from the purchaser, averting the need to sample medical providers.  
Due to the time-consuming and data-intensive nature of calculating a 
price index, purposive sampling is sometimes used.  Purposive sampling is 
more cost-effective, particularly where “clusters” of data can be collected.  
For example, instead of sampling medical scheme options to estimate 
expenditure weights, data could be collected from a single medical 
scheme administrator that administers multiple medical schemes.  
Purposive sampling is problematic in that it introduces subjective factors 
which means that sampling error cannot be calculated (ILO, et al., 2004). 
2.6. Constructing the basket of goods and 
services 
The sampling methodology will affect the weighting structure of the index, 
in that weight data will only be available for sampled items. Fisher (1927) 
refers to the concept of double-weighting (calculating weights for 
individual items and for categories of items) as a means of ensuring 
accuracy. If only the individual items are weighted, some categories may 
be given more weight relative to other categories if expenditure on the 
sampled items is a higher proportion of expenditure for those categories.  
Statistics South Africa (Haglund, 2000) and the American Bureau of Labour 
Statistics (Boskin, et al., 1998) make use of a hierarchical or pyramidal 
structure in the construction of their Consumer Price Index where 
weighting occurs on multiple levels. 
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The particular issues that need to be considered in the construction of 
the basket of goods and services to be priced include the treatment of 
seasonal goods and services, the choice of categories of expenditure and 
the definition of a unit of service.  
Whilst medical goods and services tend to be available throughout the 
year, the quantities demanded may fluctuate according to the time of the 
year. Particular diagnoses are climatic (e.g. allergic rhinitis) whilst other 
fluctuations may relate to benefit availability and practical considerations.  
For example, the scheduling of discretionary procedures decreases during 
school holidays. 
The existence of seasonal variation means that the time period upon 
which expenditure weights are based will affect which items are included 
in the basket. There may also be breaks in the price series if there are 
months during which particular goods or services are not purchased.  
Possible solutions include excluding seasonal items from the basket or 
introducing the concept of a rolling year-on-year index (ILO, et al., 2004).  
The appropriate solution will depend on the extent of the problem.  
The choice of categories of expenditure for the basket is important 
because a fixed-weight index such as a Laspeyres index does not allow for 
substitution between categories of expenditure in the periods between 
updating of weights. For example, if in-patient and out-patient services fall 
into different categories, a shift in procedures from being in-patient to 
out-patient will cause the clinical severity of cases in both settings to 
increase, although the total costs of treatment will reduce. Thus the saving 
as a result of a shift from in-patient treatment to out-patient treatment 
will not be captured.  Similarly, savings that arise from a shift from surgical 
treatment to drug treatment will not be captured. These effects are 
reduced by updating the basket more frequently or using a formula that 
makes use of current weights.   
An alternative approach would be to base the basket on episodes of 
treatments for various diseases as opposed to basing it on specific goods 
and services, in which case the weights would need to be based on the 
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money expended on various diseases (Newhouse, 2001). The idea of an 
episode of illness or treatment has become common place in contexts 
outside of medical price indices. Examples include the development of 
clinical practice guidelines and treatment protocols, as well as the 
emergence of disease management programmes (Berndt, et al., 2000). 
The choice of the unit of service for the service component of the 
basket may significantly influence the results obtained, for example, the 
unit of service for the hospital component of the basket could be a day in 
hospital or an admission (Newhouse, 2001). If the average length of stay in 
hospital decreases this would cause the average severity of a day to 
increase (because the first few days of treatment are more expensive than 
later days). As a result the average cost per day in hospital would increase.  
Thus, using a day as the unit of service will overstate the increase in price.  
To solve this problem the hospital services component of the producer 
price index in the United States treats a change in the length of stay as a 
quality change as opposed to measuring hospital services by admission 
(Berndt, et al., 2000). 
At the lowest level of an index, elementary price indices are estimated.  
The elementary price indices are based on small and fairly homogeneous 
sets of products (for example, Panado in different forms such as liquid, 
capsule and tablet, and in different pack sizes), and are most often 
calculated without the use of explicit expenditure weights due to 
limitations on data availability (ILO, et al., 2004).  The sampling methods 
can mean that the products are implicitly weighted, for example, products 
may be selected with probabilities proportional to sales (ILO, et al., 2004).  
The lack of weighting means that simple averages are used. As with 
the higher level formulae, elementary price indices can be in aggregate 
form or price relative form. The three options are the Carli index (the 
simple arithmetic mean of price relatives), the Dutot index (the ratio of 
un-weighted arithmetic mean prices) and the Jevons index (the un-
weighted geometric mean of price relatives) (ILO, et al., 2004).   
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Elementary indices can be calculated either as direct or chain-linked 
indices (direct indices compare the current price with the price in the base 
period, whilst the chain indices compare the current price with that in the 
preceding period). It is computationally easier to deal with missing prices, 
replacement items and quality changes if chain-linked indices are used 
(ILO, et al., 2004). However, only the Dutot index and the Jevons index are 
transitive and the use of a chain-linked Carli index leads to systematic 
upward bias in the index (ILO, et al., 2004).  
Statistics South Africa (2009) uses a Jevons index, denoted here as PJ, 
at elementary aggregate level. Based on both the axiomatic approach and 
the economic approach (as in section 2.4) the Jevons formula is found to 
be the preferred choice (ILO, et al., 2004). However, as it is a geometric 
average it equals zero if one price relative is zero, and is sensitive to 
extreme falls in price (ILO, et al., 2004). The Dutot index, denoted here as 
PD, can be used in situations where there is little or no price substitution, 
that is, where relative quantities remain fixed whatever the relative prices 
(ILO, et al., 2004). The formulae are as follows:  
 
              
  
 .         
 
2.7. Obtaining price data 
The medical care market is characterised by both price dispersion (price 
varying by supplier) and price discrimination (suppliers offering different 
prices for different segments of the market) (Berndt, et al., 2000). In part, 
this is because medical services are not re-sellable (i.e., there is no 
possibility for price arbitrage) and because price competition requires 
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advance price information (Berndt, et al., 2000). This is often absent in 
health care as the price of treatment depends on factors not known in 
advance, such as the diagnosis and an individual’s recovery rate, and it is 
unlikely that a consumer will undertake price comparisons in a life-
threatening or emergency situation (Berndt, et al., 2000; Hsiao, 1995).  
The procedures used to collect price data for a medical price index 
need to take these features of the market into account. Where there is no 
price discrimination, price data can be obtained from a single payer, which 
in the case of this research would be a medical scheme. The existence of 
price discrimination in a market requires that the payer is taken into 
account in the sampling procedures. Where there is no price dispersion, 
price data from a single supplier will represent the market; the greater the 
extent of price dispersion, the more important sampling procedures for 
outlets/providers will be.  
The existence of observable prices will depend on the nature of the 
health system. Systems that operate on the allocation of a global budget 
to providers, where goods and services are provided with little or no direct 
charge to the consumer, will have no observable transaction data. In the 
absence of observable prices a medical price index must be based on input 
prices such as wages (Newhouse, 2001).  
Price aggregation also impacts on the extent to which prices are 
observable. The appropriate level of aggregation to be used in the price 
index is usually dictated by how the market prices for products and 
services; however, the extent to which prices are aggregated is not 
consistent in health care as different payers pay for medical services in 
different units and these may change substantially over time (Cutler, 
McClellan, Newhouse, & Remler, 1998). The level of price aggregation 
used depends on the reimbursement mechanism, which may range from 
fee-for-service reimbursement (highly disaggregated), to the payment of 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
Of
 C
a
e T
ow
n 
26 
 
per diem1 rates, per case rates and capitation rates (a fixed amount per 
person per time period).  
The producer price index in the United States constructs a price index 
for physician services by randomly selecting a bill and then using diagnosis 
and procedure codes to re-price the bill (Berndt, et al., 2000). The bill 
covers the entire set of services provided during a patient visit, split by 
payer. Similarly the price index for hospital services is based on the same 
idea of re-pricing a bill (Berndt, et al., 2000). Statistics South Africa has 
recently adopted this methodology for the hospital services component of 
the CPI (Kelly, 2009). This methodology addresses problems arising from 
changes in reimbursement arrangements over time.  
Where observable prices are available, the index can be based on 
either list prices or transaction prices. Whilst list prices are often easier to 
obtain, they may result in a bias, for example, managed care organisations 
may negotiate with hospitals to pay a fee that is less than the list price 
(Newhouse, 2001). The greater the extent of negotiation between 
managed care organisations and medical service providers, the greater 
this discrepancy is likely to be. In many countries, differentials between list 
prices and transaction prices are also common in the pharmaceutical 
industry due to the effect of the discounts, rebates and “kick-backs” that 
are common practice in this industry. Obtaining transaction prices is 
complicated because of price discrimination between insurers and 
because transaction prices are often considered confidential and 
proprietary by insurers (Berndt, et al., 2000). Statistics South Africa has 
recently moved away from using list prices for the health component of 
CPI to using transaction prices (Kelly, 2009), largely enabled by a closer 
working relationship with the private sector.  
                                              
1
 Reimbursement based on a negotiated rate per day (as opposed to charges per good or 
service). The rate per day may vary by the type of admission and the intensity of care. 
(McLeod, 2009) 
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2.8. Updating basket weights and dealing with 
changes in quality 
In the medical sector there are rapid technological changes and frequent 
introductions of new goods and services.  The problem of having a fixed 
basket of goods and services that does not reflect changes in consumption 
is not confined to the medical sector. However, for other sectors the 
problem of having a constant basket relates primarily to the substitution 
effect. This is less of an issue in the medical sector as consumers do not 
make quantity decisions on the basis of price alone, and the bias that 
results from having a fixed basket is thus not necessarily an upward one 
(Cutler, et al., 1998).  
Changes in the composition of the list of goods and services available 
to consumers would not be a problem if the price changes for new items 
were the same as those for existing items. However, new goods often 
show atypical price development (Marris, 1958). Technological change in 
the medical sector may also result in a significant shifting across categories 
of expenditure (e.g. from in-patient to out-patient), causing the fixed-base 
weights to become out-of-date quickly (Newhouse, 2001).   
There are a large number of new product introductions in the medical 
sector, particularly pharmaceuticals. Typically new goods would only be 
taken into consideration when the basket is updated, which could result in 
considerable delays. An alternative approach would be to do 
supplementary sampling; however, there may still be a delay in 
recognising that a new good has entered the market. A significant delay 
may lead to an upward bias in the index as prices often fall after their 
initial introduction to the market. The fall in prices may be due to 
increasing economies of scale and increases in production runs. A study by 
Berndt, Griliches, & Rosett (1992) found that the prices of pharmaceutical 
products late in their life cycle increased more rapidly than those of 
products early in their life cycle.  
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Once new goods have been identified, they need to be introduced into 
the basket. In the addition-and-deletion approach the old good is removed 
from the index and the new good added such that the overall index is left 
unchanged; in other words, the price difference between the two goods is 
not captured; only the subsequent changes in price.  The assumption here 
is that the price difference between the products represents the consumer 
valuation of any quality difference, which in turn is based on an 
assumption that the market is efficient (Newhouse, 2001). The arguments 
for why this assumption is unlikely to hold for medical goods and services 
were presented in section 2.2.  
Alternatively the price difference between the old and new goods may 
be reflected in the index with no adjustment for changes in quality: any 
difference in price is reflected as a pure price increase regardless of 
whether part of the price differential can be attributed to quality 
differences (Newhouse, 2001).   
Generic drugs are a special case of “new goods”: they are essentially 
an old good under a new label. They need to be allowed for because of the 
dramatic pricing differences that exist between generic drugs and 
patented drugs. In the American market, generic drugs typically enter the 
market at about a one-third discount to the patented drug and the 
discount tends to rise as more generic producers enter the market  
(Newhouse, 2001). Using an addition-and-deletion approach would result 
in the price difference between patented drugs and generic equivalents 
not being captured. 
Berndt et al. (2000) describe how generic drugs are allowed for in the 
American consumer price index and in the producer price index. The 
approach for the consumer price index is as follows: six months after 
patented drugs lose their patent protection the Bureau of Labour Statistics 
randomly selects from branded and generic versions of the drug where 
the probability of being selected is linked to the volume of sales in that 
month. If a generic drug is selected then the entire price difference 
between the generic and the branded product is treated as a price change.  
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This is essentially a once-off possibility for substitution before the basket is 
next updated. The criticism of this method is that six months may not be 
long enough for certain generics to gain market share. 
The producer price index approach is different in that drugs in the 
sample that lose patent protection have their weight split for the generic 
equivalent and the brand. The price change is then treated as a pure price 
change. The split used to be 64.2% for the generic and 35.8% for the 
branded product and is now split on the value of sales.  The impact on the 
index depends on the timing of when this is done (Berndt, et al., 2000).  
Neither the addition-and-deletion approach nor the approach where 
price differences are captured in full make explicit allowance for changes 
in quality and thus do not make allowance for the impact of new products 
on consumer welfare (Newhouse, 2001). Making explicit adjustments for 
quality raises the issues identified in section 2.2 relating to the complex 
relationship between medical care, health and utility.  Newhouse (2001) 
argues that the problems with medical price indices persist because the 
methods which are more theoretically correct are difficult or costly to 
implement. Possible approaches include hedonic analysis, demand 
analysis and clinical outcomes research. 
The hedonic approach to quality adjustments makes use of regression 
analysis where the price of a medical good or service is the dependent 
variable, and the attributes of the medical procedure, the provider and the 
patient are the explanatory variables (Newhouse, 2001). This approach 
uses an estimate of market prices for the key attributes of the medical 
procedure to adjust for quality change by separating price changes over 
time into changes attributable to improvements and pure price change. 
However, the parameters in the regression would be based on data 
reflecting the inefficiencies of the medical care market that arise due to, 
inter alia, the effect of moral hazard and agency problems which makes it 
difficult to derive economic welfare implications from the results of the 
analysis (Berndt, et al., 2000).  
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Hedonic price analysis can also be implemented at the level of a 
medical scheme option. Here the dependent variable would be the price 
of cover and the explanatory variables would be the attributes of the 
benefit option. This approach would require that factors such as the 
profile of people on the option be controlled for, and it requires an 
understanding of how consumers select benefit plans, including issues of 
moral hazard, anti-selection and employer decision-making. However, 
inefficiencies may arise in the medical scheme market because consumers 
are not fully aware of the good they are purchasing (Berndt, et al., 2000).  
The other approach to quality adjustments involves creating explicit 
models of individual demand for health care. Making assumptions about 
the way in which treatment decisions are made assumes that consumers 
have a specified distribution of preferences or that consumers are making 
decisions for goods and services where they bear a high proportion of the 
costs themselves (Berndt, et al., 2000). Consequently, this approach does 
not work well for medical care because consumer information is poor and, 
where consumers have comprehensive private medical insurance, out-of-
pocket expenditure is relatively low.  
Clinical outcomes research aims to overcome these problems. It 
involves looking outside of market transactions, with analyses done on an 
illness-by-illness basis. The approach requires a sample of a representative 
mix of illnesses to allow for the extent to which medical care progress has 
varied by illness.  Un
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2.9. Theoretical development of medical price 
indices in South Africa 
2.9.1. The medical component of CPI 
Statistics South Africa follows the methodological guidelines in the 
International Labour Organisation (ILO) manual when compiling the South 
African CPI. The manual provides the theory and conceptual framework, 
together with methodological and practical guidelines for the compilation 
of consumer price indices. The ILO is viewed as being the authoritative 
body on the topic of consumer price indices. Statistics South Africa also 
works with a number of professional expert groups such as the United 
Nations International Working Group on Price Indices and the ILO/United 
Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) joint meeting to 
ensure that the CPI methodology keeps pace with international best 
practice (Statistics South Africa, 2009).  
The current South African CPI weights are largely based on the 2005/6 
Income and Expenditure survey (IES) which was released in March 2008. 
The survey ran from September 2005 to August 2006, allowing for a 12-
month period in which seasonal expenditure patterns were identified.  
Statistics South Africa uses a sampling methodology for items to include in 
the basket based on a combination of expenditure and frequency, the 
intention being to exclude very high-cost, low-frequency items (luxury 
goods) and also to exclude very high-frequency, low-cost items (Statistics 
South Africa, 2009).  
Weights represent the proportions of total consumption expenditure 
of households, and are updated every five years (Statistics South Africa, 
2009). Prices are updated on a monthly, quarterly or annual basis with a 
Jevons index being used for the elementary aggregates and a Young index 
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being used for higher-level aggregation (Statistics South Africa, 2009). The 
index is published monthly. 
The most recent re-weighting of the CPI was used as an opportunity to 
overhaul the index. Relevant changes include a streamlining of the basket 
of goods and services and the introduction of a new classification system 
(Kelly, 2009). Of particular relevance is the reclassification of medical 
scheme contributions from “Medical care and health expenses” in the old 
system to “Miscellaneous goods and service” in the new system. The new 
classification (as it relates to medical expenditure) is given in Table 2.1.  
 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
Of
 C
ap
e T
ow
n 
33 
 
Table 2.1 Classification of medical goods and services, and health insurance in the Consumer 
Price Index  
Category  Class Group Indicator Product 
Health 
Medical products, 
appliances and 
equipment 
Pharmaceutical 
products 
Pain killers 
Cough mixture 
Vitamin and 
mineral 
supplement 
Sinus medication 
Fungal medication 
Cold and flu 
medication 
Heartburn 
medication 
Muscle pain relief 
gel 
Sore throat 
lozenges 
Laxative 
Dispensing fees 
Out-patient 
services 
Medical services 
General 
Practitioners 
Obstetricians and 
Gynaecologists 
Physicians 
Paediatricians 
Dental services Dentists 
Hospital services Hospital services 
Medical  
Surgical 
Maternity 
Miscellan-
eous 
goods and 
services 
Insurance 
Insurance 
connected with 
health 
Health insurance 
Source: Statistics South Africa (2009) 
 
As can be seen in Table 2.2, the health category of the index now has a 
significantly lower weighting (down from 6.90% to 1.47%) (Kelly, 2009). 
This is only partly accounted for by the re-classification of medical scheme 
contributions. Differences may have arisen due to changes in the IES, for 
example, the most recent survey makes use of both recall and diary 
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methods whereas previously only recall methods were used (Statistics 
South Africa, 2009). 
 
Table 2.2 Updated health weights in the Headline Consumer Price Index (2000 and 2008) 
Headline CPI  2000 2008 
Total health  6,90  (includes 
insurance) 
1,47 (excludes 
insurance) 
Medical professionals  2,25  0,72 
Hospital services  0,63  0,18 
Medical products  2,47  0,57 
Medical equipment  0,14  n/a 
   
Medical insurance  1,51  3,68 
Source: Kelly (2009) 
 
The collection of prices for medical goods and services has also been 
improved. Prices for prescribed pharmaceutical products are obtained 
from electronic real-time data (from a company that facilitates electronic 
submission and processing of accounts) (Statistics South Africa, 2009). The 
selection of pharmaceutical products for pricing was done using data from 
the same source, representing approximately 90 per cent of all 
transactions between pharmacies and medical aid schemes (Statistics 
South Africa, 2009).  Transaction prices are used, and dispensing fees are 
taken into account (Kelly, 2009). The index thus largely ignores doctor-
dispensed pharmaceuticals. 
Prices are not collected for all types of medical practitioners, but only 
for general practitioners, gynaecologists and obstetricians, paediatricians, 
physicians and dentists (Statistics South Africa, 2009). Transaction prices 
are used (based on a national survey of 550 practitioners), whereas in the 
past list prices were used (i.e. drawn directly from the National Health 
Reference Price List, NHRPL) (Kelly, 2009). The sample is drawn from a 
Board of Healthcare Funders (BHF) database, based on the benefits paid 
by medical aid schemes in 2006 to each of the practitioner types (Kelly, 
2009). This represents a significant improvement as practitioners 
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frequently charge fees in excess of the NHRPL. Prices are obtained for 
consultations and limited (out-of-hospital) procedures, as well as for 
different classes of patient (e.g. private patients and medical scheme 
patients) (Statistics South Africa, 2009). Collecting prices for patients that 
belong to medical schemes recognises that these patients frequently 
encounter out-of-pocket expenditure.  
Previously only public hospitals were reflected in the index; now only 
private hospitals are reflected (Kelly, 2009). This recognises that 
uncovered lives are not limited to making use of the public sector, and 
that private hospitals report increased usage by uncovered lives  
(Matsebula & Willie, 2007). The sample frame was based on data from the 
Hospital Association of South Africa (HASA). The sampling takes into 
account larger private hospital groups, each of which had to have a share 
of 15% or more of registered hospitals to be included (Kelly, 2009). 
Transaction prices are also used for hospitals: a sample of surgical 
admissions, medical admissions and maternity accounts are selected at 
the beginning of each year and subsequently re-priced on a quarterly basis 
(Kelly, 2009). This is an improvement on using list prices for ward costs, 
theatre costs and consumables, and allows for shifting between the 
categories as well as alternative reimbursement agreements.  
2.9.2. Recent work on private sector medical price 
indices 
The research done by Da Silva (2007) is of key relevance. It is the only 
piece of South African medical price index work, based on medical scheme 
data that is in the public domain. The index is intended to reflect price 
changes as experienced by medical scheme beneficiaries. The work was 
based on a dataset obtained from Discovery Health Pty (Ltd) reflecting the 
claims experience of nine medical schemes over the period January 2001 
to November 2005. Da Silva (2007) does not comment on the quality of 
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the Discovery dataset used in her research, except to say that duplicate 
claims were excluded. Discovery market share, in terms of numbers of 
beneficiaries, ranged from 17.7% in 2002 to 26.5% in 2005 (Council for 
Medical Schemes, 2006a). The dataset is thus likely to have been broadly 
representative of the market. There are, however, biases in the results 
that reflect the influence of a single administrator, for example, a drop in 
chronic medication prices is observed in January 2004 and this is 
attributed to the introduction of a drug formulary by the administrator. 
Da Silva (2007) used a sub-set of claims data based on the frequency 
with which an item was claimed, with the sample size ranging between 
70% and 80% of a category. A retrospective check was done to ensure that 
the index covered at least 50% of expenditure.  
The definition of price used by Da Silva (2007) is the full price claimed 
by the beneficiary (referred to as the “account amount”) and not the price 
reimbursed by the medical scheme. The expenditure weights used to 
calculate the index are thus based on the product of the number of claims 
and claimed amount, and not the actual scheme expenditure in each 
category.  
Table 2.3 compares the Da Silva weights to the overall medical scheme 
expenditure weights obtained from the 2006 Council for Medical Schemes 
annual report (reflecting 2005 data). The weights for the specialist 
category and the general practitioner category are lower than the medical 
scheme expenditure shares. These are the categories where beneficiaries 
are most likely to be charged a price higher than the maximum the 
scheme will reimburse.   
 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
Of
 C
ap
e T
ow
 
37 
 
Table 2.3 Comparison of category weights between the Da Silva index and medical scheme 
industry expenditure 
 Da Silva 
(2005 data)* 
The Council 
(2005 data) 
Hospital 39.0% 39.1% 
Specialist 25.0% 20.7% 
Pharmaceutical 16.0% 15.6% 
General Practitioner 8.0% 7.1% 
Other 11.0% 17.5% 
Source: Da Silva (2007); (Council for Medical Schemes, 2006a) 
* these numbers were taken directly from the Da Silva (2007) paper where they do not add to 
100% due to rounding. 
 
The formula used by Da Silva (2007) was described as a chain-linked 
Laspeyres formula, with weights based on expenditure over a three-year 
period. Da Silva (2007) refers to making use of annual weights in some 
cases to allow for the introduction of new codes, it is, however, not clear 
how the three-year weights and annual weights were integrated. 
Da Silva (2007) based the pharmaceutical component of the index on 
pharmaceutical claim lines, i.e. on the price per pack, not the price of each 
unit within a pack. The unit of service used for hospital claims was a 
hospital event and the chosen unit of service for all other medical claims 
was the NHRPL tariff code. 
Both Mediscor and Medikredit, clearing houses for pharmaceutical 
claims2, publish pharmaceutical price indices. However there is little 
information about the indices available in the public domain. The 
Medikredit index was created to measure the effect of the introduction of 
Single Exit Pricing for pharmaceuticals, and covers 86% of medicines 
available in South Africa (Jones, 2005). The index is restricted to 
pharmaceuticals used outside of hospital, and weights are calculated on 
annual data to remove seasonal effects (Jones, 2005). Email contact with 
Medikredit in an attempt to obtain further information was unsuccessful.  
                                              
2
 Medicine clearing houses enable on-line real-time claims processing for pharmaceutical 
claims by interfacing between medical schemes and pharmacies. 
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The results of the Mediscor index have been presented at a 
conference (Bester, 2009) but the methodology was not published. No 
meaningful analysis can be done without understanding how the Mediscor 
numbers were calculated.  
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Chapter 3 
3. Literature review - factors influencing the 
mix of goods and services purchased by 
medical schemes 
This chapter is not intended to be a comprehensive discussion of all the 
factors that could possibly affect medical scheme purchasing patterns.  
Rather, the intention is to highlight those factors that have been of 
particular importance over the period analysed (2000-2009). 
3.1. Goods and services purchased by medical 
schemes 
Data on the major categories of medical scheme expenditure can be found 
in the Council for Medical Scheme (the Council) reports which are 
compiled from the annual returns submitted by schemes. The most recent 
report available, published in 2009, reflects 2008 expenditure. Data for 
2009 will only be available in the latter half of 2010.  
In 2008 expenditure on non-medical goods and services made up 
14.3% of total expenditure (Council for Medical Schemes, 2009a). The 
relative expenditure on non-medical items increased between 2000 and 
2001 (from 13.9% to 16.3%) but has been declining since 2005 (Council for 
Medical Schemes, 2001, 2002, 2003a, 2004, 2005, 2006a, 2007, 2008b) . 
Based on the Council annual reports, the five major categories of 
medical expenditure for registered schemes are ‘hospital’, ‘medical 
specialist’, ‘pharmaceutical‘, ‘general practitioner’ and ‘dental’.  The split 
between these categories is illustrated in Figure 3.1.   
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The definitions of these categories used throughout this work are 
broadly consistent with those used by the Council.  It should, however, be 
noted that precise definitions of benefit categorisation may vary between 
schemes, and whilst the financial data in the annual returns are audited, 
these detailed data are not.   
‘Hospital’ expenditure refers to items billed by hospitals (ward fees, 
theatre fees, consumables, medicines dispensed in hospital, per diem 
arrangements and other alternative reimbursement arrangements), and 
not all expenditure occurring whilst a patient is being treated in hospital.  
It includes both private and public hospitals, although expenditure on 
public hospitals has declined to less than 0.94% of ‘hospital’ expenditure  
(Council for Medical Schemes, 2009a).  
‘Pharmaceutical’ expenditure includes all expenditure on 
pharmaceutical items regardless of the dispensing practitioner, the only 
exception being pharmaceuticals used in hospital (Rama & McLeod, 2001).  
Pharmaceutical benefits offered by medical schemes are typically split into 
benefits for acute medical conditions and medicines for chronic medical 
conditions3.  Medicines taken home from hospital typically form part of 
the acute pharmaceutical benefits.  Unfortunately, the split between acute 
and chronic benefits is not available from the Council annual reports.   
The ‘dental’ category includes all non-pharmaceutical items billed by 
dental practitioners (including dental specialists).  Similarly the ‘general 
practitioner’ and ‘medical specialist’ categories reflect all non-
pharmaceutical items billed by those practitioners.  The category ‘other’ is 
made up of expenditure on the supplementary and allied health 
professionals (including optometrists and physiotherapists), ex-gratia 
payments, capitated primary care arrangements and a range of 
miscellaneous items (including blood transfusion services and prostheses).  
(Council for Medical Schemes, 2007) 
                                              
3
 The differentiation between acute conditions and chronic conditions may vary between 
schemes but typically depends on the period of treatment needed, with chronic care 
being more long-term in nature. (Fish, Ramjee, Richards, & Hongoro, 2006) 
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Figure 3.1 Risk benefits for open schemes and restricted membership schemes by category of 
expenditure (2000-2008)   
Source: Data compiled from Council for Medical Schemes Annual Reports 2001 to 2009 
(Council for Medical Schemes, 2001, 2002, 2003a, 2004, 2005, 2006a, 2007, 2008b, 2009a) 
 
The split between the categories (Figure 3.1) has changed significantly 
over the period.  In recent years, the emphasis has shifted from schemes 
providing both major medical cover (encompassing in-patient care and the 
treatment of chronic disease) and day-to-day cover to a focus on just 
major medical care (McIntyre & Thiede, 2007).   
The category ‘other’ increased substantially from 2004 to 2005.  This 
was largely due to an increase in capitated primary care arrangements 4 
(Figure 3.2).  The item ‘pharmacist’ appears in the Council reports from 
2005 – this relates to the fees (over and above dispensing fees) that 
pharmacists are now able to charge.  This has seen a portion of 
expenditure that would previously have been part of pharmaceutical 
expenditure (in the form of a mark-up) being shifted to ‘other’.  
                                              
4 Arrangements where, typically, the funder pays a negotiated monthly amount to a 
primary care provider per person registered with that provider. In return, the provider 
assumes responsibility for the primary medical care for that person. The provider 
receives the monthly fee regardless of whether the registered person makes use of their 
services or not. (Actuarial Society of South Africa, 2008) 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Other 7.8% 10.2% 8.6% 10.2% 10.4% 14.0% 13.1% 13.1% 11.4%
Dental 5.5% 5.3% 5.0% 4.6% 3.9% 3.5% 3.2% 3.2% 2.8%
General Practitioner 7.3% 7.7% 7.6% 6.8% 5.9% 7.1% 7.5% 7.0% 7.4%
Pharmaceutical 25.4% 24.4% 22.8% 20.2% 17.4% 15.6% 15.1% 14.7% 15.6%
Medical Specialist 20.0% 20.0% 20.0% 20.0% 19.9% 20.7% 21.8% 21.9% 21.9%
Hospital 34.0% 32.4% 36.0% 38.3% 42.6% 39.1% 39.4% 40.1% 40.9%
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Expenditure attributed to medical technologists has also increased over 
the period. The reasons for the decline in the “other” category between 
2005 and 2008 are not clear.   
 
Figure 3.2 ‘Other’ benefits for open schemes and restricted membership schemes as a percentage 
of risk benefits (2000-2008) 
Source: Data compiled from Council for Medical Schemes Annual Reports 2001 to 2009  
(Council for Medical Schemes, 2001, 2002, 2003a, 2004, 2005, 2006a, 2007, 2008b, 2009a) 
 
Figure 3.3 illustrates the breakdown of non-medical expenditure into 
its major categories: ‘administration’, ‘managed care’ and ‘acquisition’.   
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Figure 3.3 Breakdown of non-medical expenditure for open schemes and restricted membership 
schemes as a percentage of operational expenditure (2000-2008) 
Source: Data compiled from Council for Medical Schemes Annual Reports 2001 to 2009  
(Council for Medical Schemes, 2001, 2002, 2003a, 2004, 2005, 2006a, 2007, 2008b, 2009a) 
 
Administration expenditure is made up of both administration fees 
paid to third party administrators and other expenses incurred directly by 
the scheme (including trustees’ fees, audit fees and staff remuneration) 
(Rama & McLeod, 2001).  Managed care expenditure relates only to the 
purchase of managed care services, and not to managed care 
arrangements that include a transfer of risk.  These arrangements are 
included under underwriting expenditure. Acquisition in this context refers 
to the acquisition of new members and includes expenditure on brokerage 
fees and marketing.  
The category ‘other’ includes bad debts (referred to as ‘net 
impairment losses: trade and other receivables’) and the net reinsurance 
result (reinsurance premiums less reinsurance recoveries).  Reinsurance is 
classified as a non-medical expenditure and not as part of underwriting 
expenditure for historical reasons. This is discussed further in section 
3.4.5. 
Contributions to reserves and investment-related cash flows are not 
discussed here as they do not relate to the consumptive activities of 
medical schemes.  
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Other 1.3% 1.6% 1.2% 1.1% 0.5% 0.7% 0.1% 0.2% 0.2%
Acquisition 0.8% 0.9% 0.9% 1.4% 1.8% 1.9% 1.8% 1.7% 1.7%
Managed Care 3.1% 3.0% 2.6% 2.7% 2.8% 2.6% 2.6% 2.5% 2.5%
Administration 8.8% 10.8% 10.9% 11.1% 11.4% 11.4% 11.0% 10.6% 9.9%
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3.2. Differences between open schemes and 
restricted membership schemes 
There are three types of medical schemes in South Africa: schemes which 
allow public membership (open schemes), schemes which limit 
membership to pre-defined groups of people (restricted membership 
schemes) and bargaining council schemes. Bargaining council schemes, 
which are regulated in terms of labour relations legislation, differ 
considerably from open and restricted schemes in that they offer different 
benefits, as Prescribed Minimum Benefits do not have to be provided, and 
they tend to have lower levels of contributions.  
The most recently available data (relating to the 2004 benefit year) 
indicate that bargaining council schemes account for only 3.66% of 
medical scheme beneficiaries, and an even lower 1.30% of net 
contributions (Council for Medical Schemes, 2005). 
Expenditure patterns differ between open and restricted membership 
schemes, as shown in Figure 3.4, reflecting differences in their 
relationships with stakeholders such as brokers and employers, 
differences in competitive dynamics as well as differences in size and 
structure (McLeod & Ramjee, 2007).   
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Figure 3.4 Split of underwriting and operational expenditure for open schemes and restricted 
membership schemes (2008)  
Source: Council for Medical Schemes Annual Report 2008-9 (Council for Medical Schemes, 2009a) 
 
Non-medical expenditure is lower amongst restricted schemes (10.1% 
of expenditure as opposed to 17.7%), partly because restricted schemes 
do not need to incur the costs of attracting members (expenditure related 
to ‘acquisition’). Restricted schemes also have lower administration fees 
on average (Council for Medical Schemes, 2007), partly because there are 
fewer benefit options per scheme.  The collection of contributions is also 
simpler given that the administrator usually only has to deal with a single 
employer. 
Restricted schemes have a more generous approach to benefit design 
because they are not subject to competitive pressures and the risk of anti-
selection (McLeod & Ramjee, 2007). They thus spend proportionately 
more on day-to-day benefits and chronic benefits than open schemes.  
They also spend less on managed care services (Council for Medical 
Schemes, 2007).  
Open Restricted
Other 9.4% 10.5%
Dental 1.7% 3.7%
General Practitioners 5.3% 8.1%
Medicines 11.8% 16.2%
Medical Specialists 18.8% 18.8%
Hospitals 35.9% 33.5%
Non-Medical 17.0% 9.3%
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The market share of open schemes grew between 2000 and 2005, 
from 69.49% of beneficiaries to 71.76% of beneficiaries (Council for 
Medical Schemes, 2001, 2006a). This trend was arrested in 2006 with the 
rapid growth of the Government Employees Medical Scheme (GEMS), a 
restricted membership scheme for public sector workers (Council for 
Medical Schemes, 2007). The open scheme share of expenditure, and 
hence their influence on the mix of goods and services purchased, 
increased more than their market share over the period (Council for 
Medical Schemes, 2001, 2006a).  
3.3. Benefit options offered by schemes  
Each medical scheme may offer more than one product, referred to as 
‘benefit options’, as long as each option covers a statutory minimum 
package, called the Prescribed Minimum Benefits (PMBs) (Republic of 
South Africa, 1998). Each option is required to be self-supporting, both 
financially and in terms of membership.  Both the principal member and 
his/her dependants are required to belong to the same benefit option, 
and movement between options (referred to as option changes) may only 
take place once a year. Contributions vary between individual benefit 
options and are generally fixed for a one-year period, typically a calendar 
year.  
The overall mix of goods and services purchased by the industry will 
depend on the range of benefit options offered by schemes and the 
options selected by the members of those schemes. 
On average open schemes offer more options per scheme than 
restricted schemes; 5.4 as opposed to 2.1 (Council for Medical Schemes, 
2009a). In part this is because open schemes tend to be bigger, with 3.63 
times as many beneficiaries per scheme (Council for Medical Schemes, 
2009a). Open schemes attempt to meet a wide spectrum of consumer 
needs by offering a range of benefit options. Between 2003 and 2008 the 
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number of options per scheme increased for both open schemes and 
restricted membership schemes (Council for Medical Schemes, 2004, 
2009a). Data on the number of options offered by schemes are not 
available in the Council annual reports prior to 2003. 
When members move between options, they tend to “buy down” from 
more expensive options to cheaper options (Joseph, 2006). This is in 
response to above-inflation contribution increases and the resultant 
affordability constraints (McLeod & Ramjee, 2007). This downward 
migration is also made possible because a high proportion of benefits are 
common across all options, as a consequence of the PMBs (Fish, et al., 
2006). Over time this trend of downward migration can be expected to 
result in expenditure being more concentrated on the PMBs. 
Schemes may also experience anti-selective “buy up” behaviour where 
members purchase more comprehensive cover as their medical needs 
increase over time - to the extent that this occurs it would have the 
opposite effect. 
3.4. The legislative and regulatory environment 
3.4.1. Prescribed Minimum Benefits 
The most significant legislative effect on the purchasing patterns of 
medical schemes is the requirement for all options to cover at least the 
PMBs, which are a legislated package of benefits that schemes are 
required to cover in full, without co-payments or financial limits. The 
PMBs currently include cover for emergency care, 270 diagnosis-
treatment pairs and 25 Chronic Disease List (CDL) conditions, but the 
package has been under review since 2008 (Council for Medical Schemes, 
2009c). The diagnosis-treatment pairs were introduced from 1 January 
2000, and care is primarily hospital-based. The emergency medical 
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conditions were clarified from 1 January 2003. Cover for the CDL 
conditions were implemented on 1 January 2004 and include diagnosis, 
treatment and chronic medication according to therapeutic algorithms 
(McLeod & Ramjee, 2007).  
The introduction and subsequent extension of the PMBs had a 
significant impact on benefits offered by schemes. In particular, the 
introduction of the CDL forced schemes to introduce chronic benefits on 
options that previously offered no such benefits. At the same time, in 
order for schemes to manage their expenditure, coverage was reduced on 
many of the options that had previously provided cover in excess of the 
CDL. The CDL also encourages a more disease-based benefit design than a 
treatment-based benefit design (Fish, et al., 2006).  
3.4.2. Underwriting limitations 
The medical schemes environment is characterised by the key social 
solidarity principles of open enrolment5 and community rating. 
Membership is voluntary and schemes have limited protection against 
anti-selection, with the Medical Schemes Act only allowing for the 
imposition of waiting periods and late-joiner penalties, and only under a 
limited set of circumstances. The regulatory environment influences the 
population covered by medical schemes, discussed further in Section 3.6. 
3.4.3. Variable benefits within a single option 
In May 2005, a directive was sent by the Council for Medical Schemes to 
the Principal Officers of medical schemes indicating that schemes could no 
longer offer variable day-to-day benefits within a single benefit option 
                                              
5
 Open schemes have to accept anyone who wants to become a member at standard 
rates (McLeod & Ramjee, 2007). 
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(Council for Medical Schemes, 2006a).  This had the effect of reducing the 
variation in benefits within an option and forced schemes to re-consider 
their benefit design. 
3.4.4. Medical savings accounts 
Medical scheme contributions are made up of risk contributions and 
savings account contributions. The risk contributions purchase the 
member (and his or her beneficiaries) insurance cover as part of a risk 
pool. They include loadings for non-medical expenditure (e.g. 
administration and broker commission). Savings contributions accrue in 
their entirety to a personal savings account for each member (i.e. there is 
no risk pooling). Any unused amount in a medical savings account at the 
end of a year can be rolled over to the following year, unlike risk benefits 
which are forfeited if not used.   
The 2005 directive prohibiting variable day-to-day benefits also 
stopped schemes from offering variable medical savings accounts (Council 
for Medical Schemes, 2006a), thereby reducing the flexibility and 
consumer appeal of medical savings accounts. 
Changes were made to the tax treatment of medical scheme 
contributions in March 2006. Whilst medical scheme contributions 
continue to be tax-deductible, a rand-cap on the amount that can be 
deducted was introduced. This had the effect of further reducing the 
appeal of medical savings accounts, as in most cases savings contributions 
were above the cap. 
From 2005 to 2008 savings contributions as a percentage of gross 
contributions declined from 11.66% to 9.34% (Council for Medical 
Schemes, 2006a, 2009a).  This decline in the use of medical savings 
accounts may result in increased coverage of day-to-day benefits from risk 
benefits, but this remains to be seen. 
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3.4.5. Non-medical expenditure 
In recent years, the regulatory pressure on schemes to contain non-
medical expenditure has increased.  At the same time increased regulatory 
demands on medical scheme administrators have driven up the costs of 
scheme administration, for example, administrators now need to capture 
diagnosis codes and report on clinical information in a more sophisticated 
manner (McLeod & Ramjee, 2007).  
This increased administrative complexity, together with the move 
toward real-time claims processing has resulted in a move away from self-
administration to the use of third-party administrators (with consequent 
higher administrative fees) and increased concentration in the 
administrator market. (McLeod & Ramjee, 2007) 
Following the publication of a report in 2001 revealing reinsurance 
abuses (McLeod, Slattery, & van den Heever, 2001), the Council 
intervened to severely limit the use of reinsurance by medical schemes.  
Changes to the process for applying for approval of reinsurance contracts 
were introduced in the Medical Schemes Amendment Act 2001.  
Reinsurance guidelines were published by the Council in 2002 (Council for 
Medical Schemes, 2003a).  
The effect of the decline in reinsurance can be seen in the reduction of 
the ‘other’ category of non-medical expenditure (Figure 3.3). 
3.4.6. Medicines and Related Substances Amendment 
Act and related regulations 
Regulatory changes to pharmaceutical pricing (see section 4.1 for more 
detail) in 2004 removed perverse incentives for providers to prescribe 
particular pharmaceutical products (Republic of South Africa, 2004b). This 
impacted on the mix of products prescribed. The Amended Act also makes 
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provision for generic substitution in that pharmacists are compelled to 
inform patients of the benefits of generic substitution. The policy objective 
is for the pharmacist to substitute a cheaper generic product instead of an 
original product with the understanding and consent of the patient, unless 
the prescribing doctor indicates that the original product must not be 
substituted (Department of Health, 1996). Similar product substitution 
laws in the United States in the 1980s contributed to the rise in generic 
use experienced (Cook, 1998). 
The move from percentage mark-ups on pharmaceutical products to a 
dispensing fee (discussed in more detail in Section 4.1) also encourages 
the dispensing of lower cost products, further increasing generic 
substitution. 
The Amendment Act introduced the requirement for doctors to obtain 
a license to dispense medicine. This had the effect of reducing the 
proportion of claims for medicines coming from doctors (Lakey, 2006). 
Although the majority of medicines purchased by medical scheme 
members are dispensed by pharmacists, medicines are also dispensed by 
other providers such as general practitioners, medical specialists and 
hospitals. According to data on the private sector collected by Medicsor 
(2006) significant differences in dispensing patterns exist between 
categories of providers. Differences are reflected in the mix of products, 
the average cost per item and the level of generic utilisation.   
3.5. Mechanisms for rationing benefits 
The term rationing refers to the allocation of healthcare resources as a 
response to limited availability. Demand-side rationing acts to limit patient 
demand for healthcare services, typically withholding interventions from 
some individuals. Supply-side rationing is focussed on aligning the 
provider’s incentives with the funder, usually through reimbursement 
mechanisms (Econex, 2010).  
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Both demand-side and supply-side rationing mechanisms will affect 
the mix of goods and services paid for by a medical scheme. Some 
examples of demand-side rationing in the South African environment are 
provided to illustrate the possible effect of rationing mechanisms on the 
composition of the basket. 
Pre-authorisation requires clinical approval from the medical scheme 
before benefits may be accessed, and may be for a single clinical event or 
for ongoing access to particular benefits. Examples of pre-authorisation 
for single clinical events include admission into hospital and access to 
expensive technology, such as MRI scans. This will have the effect of 
reducing the number of events paid out of scheme benefits, and in 
particular will reduce the number of discretionary events. 
Pre-authorisation for ongoing access typically involves registration on a 
benefit management programme. Common examples include chronic 
benefit management programmes and HIV benefit management 
programmes.  In order to register beneficiaries will have to meet certain 
clinical criteria. Chronic benefit management programmes aim to 
influence drug utilisation (and thus the mix of products purchased) by 
reviewing the appropriateness and cost-effectiveness of each patient’s 
drug regimen. They will also seek to eliminate drug interactions and 
duplications where these exist (Mediscor, 2009). 
The existence of benefit management programmes may reduce the 
incidence of certain claims. For example, an effective HIV benefit 
management programme may reduce the number of Aids related hospital 
admissions. 
Schemes may also ration benefits by shifting some of the expenditure 
to members.  Examples of cost-sharing mechanisms include levies, 
deductibles and co-payments.  Medical savings accounts are another form 
of member self-funding.  In the South African context, medical savings 
accounts are used to fund day-to-day benefits, effectively shifting these 
components of expenditure outside of the risk pool.   
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Cost-sharing mechanisms affect benefit utilisation (and thus the basket 
of goods and services purchased) as they increase the price sensitivity of 
medical scheme beneficiaries (Mediscor, 2004).  They also affect the price 
paid by the medical scheme, if one considers the net amount incurred by 
the scheme.  This is discussed further in section 3.5.   
As regards pharmaceutical benefits, Mediscor (2003, 2004, 2005) 
indicates that the extent of member self-funding (measured as the patient 
pay per item) increased significantly from 2002 to 2003, but subsequently 
declined from 2003 to 2004 and from 2004 to 2005.  Changes in self-
funding over time will influence the mix of products, particularly if the 
level of self-funding varies between different categories of benefits.  For 
example, Fish et al. (2006) found that the level of self-funding for non-CDL 
conditions was much higher than the level of self-funding for CDL 
conditions in 2004.   
Levies are an example of cost-sharing for pharmaceutical products. A 
levy is a relatively small, flat monetary amount paid at the point of service, 
usually per item claimed.  Levies are used in pharmaceutical benefit design 
to limit the number of prescriptions claimed for (i.e. affects frequency of 
claims) but do not influence the choice of product (Mediscor, 2004).  
Levies do not decrease the amount payable by the scheme: they are an 
additional charge to the member.   
In contrast, a deductible requires the member to pay the first part of a 
claim, up to a pre-determined amount, and decreases the amount payable 
by the scheme.  The use of deductibles has increased in recent years, 
typically targeted at reducing utilisation of benefits for discretionary 
events or expensive technology (McLeod & Ramjee, 2007).  
The term co-payment is a misnomer in the South African medical 
scheme context and typically refers to either a form of co-insurance where 
the member pays a percentage of each claim or a Rand amount the 
member is required to pay. Co-payments are frequently used in 
pharmaceutical benefit design and may be for all pharmaceutical items 
paid out of a particular benefit (e.g. all acute medicines) or may be as a 
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function of reference pricing or drug formularies (explained below), that 
is, used to influence benefit utilisation in a more targeted manner 
(Mediscor, 2004).  Co-payments may also arise if members do not make 
use of a preferred provider or, in the case of PMB benefits, if they make 
voluntary use of a non-designated service provider.   
There are three additional mechanisms used to ration pharmaceutical 
benefits: drug formularies, reference pricing and chronic disease lists. 
A drug formulary is a list of reimbursable drugs and has the effect of 
limiting coverage to those products listed, and is often used to encourage 
the use of generic products.  The use of drug formularies can decrease the 
utilisation of particular drugs if they are excluded from the formulary and 
increase the utilisation of others that are included (Mediscor, 2009).   
The application of reference pricing requires that drugs be categorised 
into therapeutic classes, with a reference drug selected in each class.  The 
maximum price to be reimbursed is then set based on this reference drug, 
with the consumer having to pay the difference in price if a more 
expensive drug is used (Mediscor, 2009).  This has an effect on the mix of 
items purchased, as consumers can be expected to alter their purchasing 
patterns to avoid having to pay in the price difference (Doonan, 2001).  
The use of chronic disease lists (where members are only covered for a 
specified list of diseases) also impacts on item coverage.  The introduction 
of the CDL has impacted on the ability schemes have to ration chronic 
benefits using co-payments and financial limits, and has thus created a 
shift in the rationing mechanisms used. Fish et al. (2006) found that the 
use of formularies increased from 2003 to 2004 whilst the number of 
diseases covered outside of the CDL declined over the same period.   
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3.6. Characteristics of the insured population 
The characteristics of the insured population will affect the extent to 
which available benefits are utilised, and hence the mix of goods and 
services purchased by the scheme. The demands of the insured population 
may also drive benefit design in a competitive environment.   
The size of population covered by medical schemes has been relatively 
stagnant over the period covered in this research, with an increase in 
coverage from 2005 onwards (McLeod & Ramjee, 2007). Little is known 
about the extent of turnover in the medical scheme population as there is 
no central database of members. The recent increase in coverage is the 
result of previously uncovered State employees joining GEMS. These 
beneficiaries are likely to have different utilisation patterns to those 
already in the system due to their lower levels of historical access to 
medical care.  
The profile of the insured population is influenced by the voluntary 
nature of the environment. Community-rated contributions combined 
with increasing affordability pressures will inevitably result in a shift in the 
risk profile of beneficiaries over time, with the young and healthy being 
most likely to remain outside of the system. This is evident by the 
changing age profile of beneficiaries over the period, with a lower 
proportion of children and young adults currently being covered (McLeod 
& Ramjee, 2007).   
The voluntary nature of the environment may also lead to anti-
selective behaviour. There is evidence of women entering the medical 
scheme environment in order to gain access to maternity benefits, with a 
consequent increase in the number of maternity cases paid for by 
schemes (McLeod & Ramjee, 2007).   
Changes in the prevalence of certain medical conditions within the 
covered population can also impact on utilisation patterns.   
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3.7. The availability of goods and services 
The goods and services available to medical schemes will change over 
time. The following discussion focuses on pharmaceutical products, but 
similar issues arise with advances in medical equipment (e.g. diagnostic 
technology), improvements in the way in which medical procedures are 
performed (e.g. laparoscopic procedures) and numerous other aspects of 
medical practice. 
The pharmaceutical product market in particular is dynamic in nature, 
with significant levels of technological change (Berndt, et al., 1992).  Drug 
innovation occurs both in the treatment of previously untreated or 
ineffectively treated conditions and in improvements to current 
treatments, with spending increases attributable to increased utilisation 
and to new treatments being more expensive than existing treatments  
(Doonan, 2001; Mediscor, 2003).  
Medical research can also influence the consumption of an existing 
product by providing or refuting clinical evidence for the use of the 
product. For example, evidence may emerge which broadens the 
indications for use of a drug or alters the recommended duration of use. 
An example of this is the recent evidence that has emerged supporting the 
long-term use of Lacosamide, an epilepsy drug (Chung, 2010). Also, 
advances in information technology have increased the speed of the 
dissemination and implementation of clinical evidence. An example of this 
is the British Medical Journal publication of a clinical evidence 
website6with RSS news feeds.  
The withdrawal of a drug can also impact on the basket dramatically.  
For example, prior to its worldwide withdrawal on 30 September 2004, 
Vioxx™ was the third highest ranking product in the Mediscor report 
(2004, 2005).   
                                              
6
 http://clinicalevidence.bmj.com/ceweb/index.jsp 
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Internationally, strong marketing drives undertaken by pharmaceutical 
companies have also been shown to impact on utilisation (Doonan, 2001).  
A local example is the product Plavix™ which experienced an increase in 
utilisation from 2003 to 2004 despite being available in South Africa since 
2000.  Mediscor (2005) attributes this increase to a stronger marketing 
drive. 
The introduction of generic equivalents to the market impacts 
significantly both on price and utilisation patterns.  The Mediscor reports 
provide a number of measures of how generic utilisation has increased in 
South African Medical Schemes, for example, the number of generic 
products in their top 50 products has increased dramatically over time.  In 
2002 there were no generic products in the top 50, in 2003 there was one, 
in 2004 six, in 2005 nine and in 2008 fifteen (Mediscor, 2003, 2004, 2005, 
2006, 2009). This further supports the need to regularly update the basket 
in order to prevent under-weighting generic items.  
Medical scheme expenditure on generic items increased from 25.3% in 
2006 to 29.3% in 2008, whilst the volume of items dispensed increased 
from 45.5% in 2006 to 47.4% in 2008 (Mediscor, 2009). A number of 
possible reasons may be advanced for the increase in generic utilisation. 
These include the introduction of more generic alternatives to the South 
African market, the role of reference pricing and formularies in promoting 
the use of generics and greater awareness of generic products amongst 
consumers (Mediscor, 2005, 2006).   
The Mediscor Medicine Review reflects substantially lower average 
expenditure per item for generics than for original products with valid 
patents and those with expired patents.  These figures can be seen in 
Table 3.1. 
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Table 3.1 Average expenditure per item 2006-2008 (branded and generic) 
Average expenditure per item 
(in Rands) 
2006 2007 2008 
Original product with valid 
patent 
145 165 184 
Original product with expired 
patent 
130 134 133 
Generic equivalents 56 67 77 
Source: Mediscor (2009) 
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Chapter 4 
4. Literature review - factors influencing the 
determination of prices 
Many of the factors influencing the composition of the basket of goods 
and services purchased by medical schemes also affect the prices of them.  
Examples include mechanisms for sharing costs with members of medical 
schemes, the introduction of generic pharmaceutical products to the 
market and reference pricing for pharmaceutical products. 
This chapter focuses on those factors affecting the prices experienced 
by medical schemes that have not already been discussed in Chapter 4. 
4.1. Pharmaceutical pricing regulations 
Since the beginning of 2004, significant changes to pharmaceutical pricing 
have occurred in the South African environment.  These changes highlight 
the need for a representative pharmaceutical price index which would 
allow the impact of such regulatory change on the prices faced by medical 
schemes to be measured.   
The changes to the pricing system were brought about through 
amendments to the Medicines and Related Substances Act (Act no 101 of 
1965), with the aim of increasing the affordability of medicines and 
ensuring a more transparent pricing process.  The Amendment Act was 
signed into law in January 2003 but aspects of the changes to the pricing 
system were challenged in court causing numerous delays in 
implementation (Forman, Pillay, & Sait, 2004).  
These changes to pricing structure are critical to consider in 
constructing a pharmaceutical price index as they affect the relationship 
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between transaction prices and list prices, the variation in price by 
dispensing provider type (i.e. pharmacist, doctor or hospital), the variation 
in price by pack size and the pattern of price increases over time. The 
extent of the impact on medicine price trends will depend on how 
effectively the legislation is implemented and monitored. 
Prior to the regulatory change the transaction price could vary 
considerably from the list price due to the existence of “a complex system 
of bonuses, rebates and other incentive schemes” (Mediscor, 2005, p.45).  
Larger suppliers of medicines could obtain medicines at a price 
significantly below the list price, and the price of a pharmaceutical product 
could thus vary between providers.  Similarly, medical schemes were able 
to obtain bulk discounts causing prices to vary between medical scheme 
and non-medical scheme members (Mediscor, 2005).  
The enabling regulations (Republic of South Africa, 2004a), which 
commence in May 2004, aimed to introduce a transparent pricing system 
by: 
1. preventing perverse incentives to increase the sales of particular 
products, for example, by providing free samples; 
2. disallowing discounting, including bulk discounts, trade discounts, 
settlement discounts and formulary listing payments (where 
payments are made to ensure that a particular medicine is 
included in a drug formulary); 
3. requiring the manufacturer (or the importer) of a medicine to 
establish a Single Exit Price (SEP) which includes all costs associated 
with the manufacture and sale of the medicine, including a logistics 
fee and VAT, at which a particular medicine has to be sold; and 
4. defining a maximum Professional Fee (referred to as a dispensing 
fee) to be charged by a licensed dispenser of medicines to cover 
the costs of dispensing (as opposed to marking up the price).  
 
The total price paid by patients for medicines was envisioned to be the 
Single Exit Price plus a maximum dispensing fee, that is, variations in 
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prices between providers should be limited to differences in the 
dispensing fees charged.  In addition, under the SEP system there is no 
variation in price according to pack size, that is, the price per tablet for a 
pack of 100 tablets and a pack of 10 tablets is the same.  The Department 
of Health regulates the maximum increase in SEP each year (via a pricing 
committee).  This is likely to result in a change in the pattern of price 
increases over time, with increases likely to be concentrated in the time 
period following the publication of the allowable increase and not spread 
throughout the year. The effect of the pricing regulations on price trends 
will depend on the extent of industry compliance and the effectiveness of 
monitoring procedures put in place by the regulator. Legal challenges to 
the medicine pricing regulations faced in 2004 and 2005 resulted in 
pharmacists charging customers and medical schemes an administration 
fee to compensate for a loss in earnings under the new medicine pricing 
laws (Mediscor, 2005). As the new regulations did not state that no other 
fee, besides the dispensing fee, could be charged, pharmacists took 
advantage of this loophole despite the disapproval of the Department of 
Health, resulting in further variation between providers.  Amended 
regulations, published in December 2006, made the charging of 
administration fees illegal (Republic of South Africa, 2006). 
Due to legal challenges to the dispensing fee regulations there have 
been periods when retail pharmacists could charge any “reasonable” 
dispensing fee, taking into account that charging an excessive fee would 
be regarded as misconduct under the Pharmacy Act.   
The Medicines Pricing Committee have proposed an International 
Benchmarking of pharmaceutical prices. The intention of doing so would 
be to reduce the price of pharmaceuticals in South Africa to the lowest of 
a defined basket of countries (Australia, Canada, New Zealand and Spain)  
(Medicines Pricing Committee, n.d.). Once implemented, this policy can be 
expected to impact materially on prices. Even in the absence of 
International Benchmarking, pharmaceutical pricing is strongly influenced 
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by global pricing decisions which in turn are influenced by regulatory 
regimes in other countries (Bond, 1999).  
4.2. The National Health Reference Price List 
(NHRPL) 
Prior to 2004, fee-for-service tariffs were negotiated centrally between 
schemes (represented by the Board of Healthcare Funders) and 
representative bodies of providers.  These tariff schedules applied to a 
wide range of medical disciplines, including general practitioners, medical 
specialists and dental practitioners. Hospital tariffs were negotiated 
between the Board of Healthcare Funders and the Hospital Association of 
South Africa, and there was no negotiation around pharmaceutical prices. 
The central negotiation of tariffs was deemed anti-competitive by the 
Competition Commission in favour of individual negotiations between 
schemes and providers. From 2004 the Council published a NHRPL to aid 
the negotiation between schemes and providers. The NHRPL was not 
intended to be a set of medical scheme tariffs, but rather a guide for both 
schemes, in determining reimbursement levels, and providers, in price 
setting (Council for Medical Schemes, 2006b).  
 As with the previous tariff schedules the NHRPL is a set of procedure 
codes. Each code published in the NHRPL has a unit value allocated to it, 
to allow schemes to determine the relative value of each procedure. The 
NHRPL values are meant to be determined using a cost-based approach 
(with submissions invited from providers), with the idea being that more 
efficient providers can charge less than the NHRPL whilst less efficient 
providers will be forced to charge more (Council for Medical Schemes, 
2006c).  
In most cases the relative values for codes did not change in the 
transition from the tariffs negotiated by the Board of Healthcare Funders, 
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and in practice the majority of schemes reimburse providers at NHRPL (or 
a multiple thereof) and there is little individual negotiation that occurs.  
This is not surprising given that there are more than 12 000 doctors 
operating in the private sector (Econex, 2009) and 131 medical schemes 
(Council for Medical Schemes, 2009a).  
It should also be noted that medical scheme members may still incur 
an out-of-pocket payment as practitioners are not obliged to charge the 
NHRPL rate. The price to the consumer and the price to the medical 
scheme may thus vary considerably. Until November 2008, the Health 
Professions Council of South Africa (HPCSA) also published a price list 
(referred to as the HPCSA ethical tariff). These tariffs were meant to be 
used to determine whether a practitioner was overcharging, and as such 
represented a price ceiling (Republic of South Africa, 1974). Historically 
the ethical tariff has been roughly three times higher than the NHRPL 
(Peters-Scheepers, 2008).   
The Department of Health (DoH) took over responsibility for the 
NHRPL from the Council from 2007.  The NHRPL relative values were not 
re-calculated in 2007 and 2008; in both years the price list was simply 
increased by an inflation linked percentage: 4.9% from 2006 to 2007 
(Council for Medical Schemes, 2006c) and 5.4% from 2007 to 2008 
(Healthman, 2009).  The 2009 price list was subject to much controversy, 
primarily due to high levels of consumer price inflation in 2008. An 
increase of 8.7% from 2008 to 2009 was initially published (Department of 
Health, 2008), but this was later increased to 10.7%.  The 2009 NHRPL is 
still subject to court action and, hence, the 2010 schedule cannot be 
determined until 2009 is finalised. In the interim the Council for Medical 
Schemes has published a notice indicating an increase of 7.9% (Council for 
Medical Schemes, 2009b).  
The linking of NHRPL increases to the CPI constitutes a major 
departure from the tariff increases in excess of the CPI achieved under 
central negotiation. This can be seen in the results of the GP and specialist 
components of the Da Silva index (Da Silva, 2007). 
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4.3. Dynamics in the health care provider 
market 
To the extent that medical schemes do negotiate prices with providers, 
the prices negotiated are affected by the relative bargaining power of the 
entities involved. Provider bargaining power is enhanced by shortages in 
supply in key areas, most notably the shortage in the numbers of medical 
specialists (Board of Healthcare Funders, 2006). In the private hospital 
market price negotiation is affected by the concentration of hospital 
ownership by three large hospital groups (Matsebula & Willie, 2007). To 
some extent this is counterbalanced by the high levels of concentration in 
the medical scheme administrator market where the six largest 
administrators provide services for 73.9% of medical scheme beneficiaries 
(Council for Medical Schemes, 2008b). Medical scheme administrators 
typically negotiate with providers on behalf of the schemes under their 
administration (Da Costa, 2008).  
4.4. The effect of rationing mechanisms on price 
Cost sharing with members was discussed in detail in section 3.5.  
Depending on the form that cost sharing takes, the price paid by the 
medical scheme may or may not be affected.  Deductibles, co-payments 
and co-insurance arrangements all reduce the net amount incurred by the 
scheme, whereas levies do not affect the scheme’s liability.   
Both drug formularies and reference pricing may force price 
competition amongst pharmaceutical companies by driving utilisation 
patterns. With drug formularies, companies may compete to be included 
on the formulary.  With reference pricing, pharmaceutical companies may 
reduce their prices to below the reference pricing level to increase sales of 
their product. 
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Medical schemes may permit members to access drugs not on the 
formulary or above the applicable reference price.  In these cases 
members will need to pay the price difference (i.e. a co-payment) 
(Mediscor, 2009).  The price from the medical scheme perspective is thus 
pegged at the level of the formulary item, or the relevant reference price. 
The South African health care market has historically been dominated 
by fee-for-service reimbursement (Broomberg & Price, 1990). Here the 
provider charges for each item used or service performed, and there is 
consequently a price available for each item. There has been an increase 
in the use of alternative reimbursement, where some of the risk is 
transferred to the provider and the price is more aggregated.  
Capitation arrangements are typically found in the arena of primary 
care benefits in South Africa and cover general practitioner consultations, 
basic optometry, basic radiology, basic pathology, acute medication and 
basic dental benefits (Ranchod, McLeod, & Adams, 2001). There may also 
be some chronic medication benefits (Fish, et al., 2006). The price from 
the medical scheme perspective is a flat amount per beneficiary per 
month, and covers multiple categories of expenditure. 
Alternative reimbursement arrangements can also be found in the 
hospital environment (Netcare Limited, 2008). Per diem arrangements and 
fixed-fee contracts are the most common (Ruff, 2001). Again the price 
from a medical scheme perspective will be more aggregated than in a fee-
for-service environment. 
Alternative reimbursement arrangements alter the profit incentives 
faced by medical providers and may act to limit price increases over time if 
providers can enhance profitability by increasing efficiency. Newhouse 
(2001) observes this effect in the US over the period 1993 to 1997, the key 
period of implementation of alternative reimbursement in that 
environment. 
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4.5. Prescribed Minimum Benefits 
Schemes are required to cover the PMBs at cost. They are thus not 
allowed to impose a maximum tariff, unless that tariff has been 
negotiated with the provider concerned. This means, that unless a scheme 
has a contract with a provider, the scheme will have to reimburse the 
provider at the price charged.   
Thus, although the scheme may reimburse providers at NHRPL, if a 
claim is a PMB and the provider charges more than NHRPL they will be 
obliged to pay the higher amount. For the most part, this does not affect 
hospital claims as schemes tend to have contracts in place with private 
hospitals. 
The existence of PMBs, and the proportion of benefits that are PMBs, 
thus impacts on the prices encountered by medical schemes.  
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Chapter 5 
5. Methodology 
In applying the theory of index construction to medical scheme prices, a 
number of methodological choices need to be made. As a starting point 
the index needs to be defined precisely and sources of data need to be 
identified.  Decisions are required regarding the choice of reference 
period, the frequency of publication, the weighting structure of the index, 
the units of service for each component of the index, the elementary 
aggregation of individual items and the sampling of items to include in the 
index.  
5.1. Defining the index 
The aim of the price index is to measure the change in the prices of goods 
and services purchased or acquired by South African medical schemes, 
including both medical and non-medical goods and services. The goods 
and services are used either directly or indirectly to satisfy the demands of 
medical scheme members. 
The index will reflect the experiences of both open and restricted 
membership medical schemes. Bargaining Council schemes will not be 
included as they differ substantially from registered schemes, and their 
inclusion in the index would make both data collection and index 
construction more complex, and distort the index without making it 
applicable to these schemes.  
Expenditure from medical savings accounts will also not be included in 
the construction of the index, both in terms of weights and price changes, 
because the expenditure from these accounts is not considered to be 
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medical scheme expenditure. Medical savings accounts are similar to 
personal bank accounts in that the funds in a savings account belong to 
the member and do not form part of scheme assets.   
The consumer price index has geographically-determined sub-indices. 
Currently there are insufficient data available to support such a split in the 
medical scheme context. Whilst there are rural/urban differences in the 
demand for goods and services, the majority of medical scheme members 
are located in urban areas. The existence of the Discovery Coastal Core 
option points to the possibility of differences in regional experience but 
further work is required to clarify the extent of these differences. 
5.2. Data 
5.2.1. Sources of data 
Data are required both for determining the weights of the index and for 
calculating changes in price.  In a consumer price index, data for the 
weighting structure are typically obtained from a survey of household 
expenditure whilst price data are collected from outlets (ILO, et al., 2004).  
For a medical scheme index, data are required on the expenditure 
patterns of medical schemes.  High-level summarised data on the 
expenditure patterns of medical schemes can be obtained from the 
Council for Medical Schemes Annual Reports, which are in turn based on 
annual returns submitted by schemes to the regulator.  This source of data 
has the advantage of being for the medical scheme industry as a whole, 
obviating the need for sampling from the population of all medical 
schemes.  The data are also audited, and thus reliable.  There are, 
however, a number of disadvantages: there is no detailed information 
available, there is a lag in the availability of the data (typically data from 
one year are only available by August of the following year) and it is 
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impossible to allow for differences in definition or coding of data by the 
individual schemes. 
More detailed data on expenditure patterns are obtainable directly 
from medical schemes.  Medical scheme data are typically managed and 
controlled by the administrator of the scheme, although legally the data 
are owned by the scheme.  Medical scheme data could be obtained 
directly from the scheme administrators provided permission has been 
obtained from the scheme itself.  Whilst there is considerable overlap in 
the data managed by different administrators, there may be differences in 
the fields included, data definitions, the grouping of data and in overall 
data quality.   
Medical scheme administrators store large quantities of detailed data 
relating both to the contributions collected and claims paid.  Historical 
data may also be available from particular administrators, enabling the 
back-testing of any indices constructed. Medical scheme data are typically 
available in a usable format as the data are used extensively for other 
purposes, for example, pricing and risk management.  The ease of use of 
medical scheme data is greatly enhanced by the broad and standardised 
use of “coding” (discussed further in 5.2.2).   
Obtaining data from medical scheme administrators and not from 
schemes directly has the practical advantage of there being fewer parties 
from which to obtain data.  The administrator market is highly 
concentrated, with the six largest administrators providing services for 
73.9% of medical scheme beneficiaries (Council for Medical Schemes, 
2008b). It is proposed that sampling be done purposively, with data 
collected in so-called clusters from these six medical scheme 
administrators.  
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5.2.1. Data quality 
There is little information available on the quality of medical scheme data, 
and the extent to which quality varies between administrators (and thus 
schemes).   
A 2002 survey of the medical scheme industry indicated problems with 
both the type of data collected by schemes and the quality thereof, 
including a lack of data standardisation (Council for Medical Schemes, 
2003c).  Numerous developments since then, such as the introduction of 
compulsory diagnosis coding and the process requiring schemes to submit 
mock Risk Equalisation Fund (REF) returns to the Council, are likely to have 
led to an increase in the standard of data kept.  The Council has been 
assessing the quality of medical scheme REF return submissions and whilst 
these data are not directly comparable to the data needed for the 
construction of an index, the Council assessment does provide some 
indication of data accuracy, particularly relating to the clinical coding of 
the data.  For the 2006 submissions, data in respect of 72% of medical 
scheme beneficiaries was rated as being of “fair” quality (Council for 
Medical Schemes, 2007).  On the other hand, the Council found that the 
quality of data differs between medical scheme administrators (Council for 
Medical Schemes, 2008c).  
Additional sources of data include managed care companies and 
medicine clearing houses (such as Mediscor and Medikredit).  Data from 
these sources may be useful for checking the data from medical scheme 
administrators as well as to provide supplementary information.  For 
example, data from medicine clearing houses could be used to 
supplement data on medicine pack sizes.  It may be necessary to obtain 
data in respect of capitated benefits from the relevant managed care 
companies. Fish et al. (2006) found that capitated benefits are typically 
not provided on a “look-through” basis, that is, the scheme is not able to 
identify separately the various categories of costs.    
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Were data for the construction of an index to be collected on an 
industry-wide basis, a shadow period during which data quality can be 
assessed may be desirable.  During the REF shadow return process data 
quality was found to improve significantly: in a 6 month period the 
proportion of beneficiaries with data rated as being “poor” declined from 
25% to just 7% (Council for Medical Schemes, 2007).  A shadow period 
allows feedback to the scheme administrators should system changes be 
necessary.  The support of the regulator in such a data collection process 
is also desirable as such a process would need to be mandated by law. 
5.2.2. Standardised coding systems used by South 
African medical schemes 
Extensive standardised coding is applied by the medical scheme industry.  
The use of codes has the advantage of summarising large amounts of data 
in a single code, thereby reducing the size of datasets.  It also ensures that 
information is presented consistently, and enhances the capability to 
consolidate data from different sources (Council for Medical Schemes, 
2003c).  Standard codes exist for pharmaceutical products, diagnoses, 
procedures and fee-for-service billing.  
Pharmaceutical products are uniquely identified in medical scheme 
data using the National Pharmaceutical Product Interface (NAPPI) coding 
system.  This system is widely used in the private health sector, whilst the 
public sector makes use of the National Stock Number (NSN) system.  The 
NAPPI system is maintained and published by MediKredit, a private sector 
medicine clearing house, and is freely available. Given that the coding 
system is not a publicly available official coding system it is of uncertain 
quality and bias. 
A six-digit NAPPI code provides information on the manufacturer of 
the product, the product name, the strength and the formulation (tablet, 
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syrup, capsule etc).  The additional three digits in a nine-digit NAPPI code 
provide information on the pack size. (MediKredit, 2006)  
The International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related 
Health Problems (ICD) system of diagnosis coding was initially developed 
to aid the collection of mortality and morbidity statistics and has become 
the international standard for diagnosis classification.  The World Health 
Organisation is responsible for maintaining and updating the coding 
system - the ICD-10 is the tenth revision of the ICD coding system and has 
been in use since 1994. (World Health Organisation, n.d.)  
The ICD-10 system is a hierarchical, alpha-numeric system that 
translates the clinical diagnosis of an illness, injury or condition into a 
code, and has been accepted as the standard to be used in both the public 
and private sectors in South Africa (Council for Medical Schemes, 2003c). 
In the private sector, diagnosis coding has been used extensively by 
managed care organisations for a long time in order to improve the clinical 
quality of their data; for example, a hospital pre-authorisation usually has 
a diagnosis code to facilitate communication between the managed care 
organisation and the hospital. However, ICD-10 coding only became 
compulsory for all medical providers as of 1 July 2006: the National Task 
Team for ICD-10 implementation was established in January 2004 to 
oversee this process, and a phased-in approach for providers began on 1 
July 2005 (National Task Team On  ICD-10 Implementation, 2006). There 
are numerous problems with diagnosis coding including the subjective 
nature of diagnoses, the need for highly skilled personnel to interpret 
clinical information into codes and the scope for code manipulation. 
The Current Procedural Terminology (CPT) system is the standard 
procedure coding system used in the South African private sector, the 
local version of which is licensed by the South African Medical Association 
(SAMA) and referred to as the Complete CPT for South Africa (CCSA) 
(Actuarial & Insurance Solutions at Deloitte & Ferreira, 2007).  CPT codes 
are 5-digit codes and there are approximately 7 000 codes for medical, 
surgical and diagnostic services and procedures (Council for Medical 
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Schemes, 2003c).  The CPT system was developed for use by doctors, but 
is used by both doctors and hospitals in South Africa, with the system 
mainly used to code in-hospital services in South Africa (Actuarial & 
Insurance Solutions at Deloitte & Ferreira, 2007). The codes are used to 
describe hospital admissions and are not used for billing purposes. 
The NHRPL is a set of fee-for-services reference prices used for billing 
by private health practitioners in South Africa.  The primary purpose of the 
NHRPL coding system is for billing and not to provide descriptive 
information (Actuarial & Insurance Solutions at Deloitte & Ferreira, 2007).  
The NHRPL codes play an essential role in the construction of the price 
index as they link directly with price data.  However, because the NHRPL 
coding system is not a hierarchical coding system (Actuarial & Insurance 
Solutions at Deloitte & Ferreira, 2007), there is limited scope to use it as 
part of the weighting structure of the index. 
The NHRPL system allows for code modifiers to be used in cases where 
the circumstances of the medical event support the charging of a higher 
fee. For example, where surgery is performed on newborn babies, 
surgeons may charge the standard fee for the procedure plus an 
additional 50%. It is proposed that all claims with modifiers be excluded 
from the data for the purpose of calculating transaction prices. Further 
work needs to be done to evaluate the extent to which modifiers are used 
and the accuracy and consistency of their use. A potential disadvantage of 
excluding modifiers is that if the extent of use of modifiers changes over 
time an element of price change would not be captured by the index. A 
fee-for-service environment may encourage the use of modifiers and the 
index would thus understate true price changes. 
Other propriety coding systems may also be used, for example, PMB 
claim identifiers, Diagnosis-Related Groupers (DRGs) and episode 
groupers. 
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5.3. The weight reference period and frequency 
of publication 
The reference period is the time period to which the estimated weights 
relate. The chosen period should cover a seasonal cycle, which in the case 
of medical schemes would be a calendar year.  The demand for medical 
goods and services tends to vary over a calendar year, for reasons of 
climate, benefit availability and practical considerations (for example, 
doctors tend not to schedule elective procedures over the year-end 
holiday period). To eliminate seasonal biases in the basket it is suggested 
that the basket weights be based on annual data (allowing sufficient time 
for claims to be fully run off).  
Whilst there are some items in the basket which experience annual 
price changes, for example administration fees and items that are priced 
according to the NHRPL, other items in the basket may experience price 
changes at any time during the year.  An index reflecting monthly changes 
in prices is proposed, as this is in line with the publication of official 
statistics and significant price changes are unlikely to occur more 
frequently than monthly.  
5.4. Classification of goods and services 
The way in which goods and services are classified provides the weighting 
and aggregation structure of the index, as well as the scheme for 
stratifying products in the sampling frame. The range of sub-indices that 
can be published will also depend on how the index is structured. 
Goods and services can be classified according to their purpose or 
according to product type (ILO, et al., 2004). A hybrid is suggested here 
with a purpose-based classification at the highest levels, and a product-
based classification at the lower levels. At the highest level it makes sense 
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to split the index into medical goods and services (where the purpose of 
expenditure is to meet the medical needs of medical scheme 
beneficiaries) and non-medical goods and services (where the purpose of 
expenditure is to enable functioning of the medical scheme itself).  
A product-type approach is chosen for the lower levels of the index, as 
it closely reflects the economic reality of medical schemes, where price 
dynamics vary along product lines, for example, the occurrence of 
separate tariff negotiations for the various practitioner groups. If 
considered from the perspective of providing a stratification scheme for 
sampling, the suggested structure will minimise the within-stratum 
variance while at the same time maximising the between-stratum variance 
(ILO, et al., 2004). 
The major categories of expenditure outlined in the Council annual 
reports for medical goods and services are hospital, medical specialist, 
pharmaceutical, general practitioner, dental and other. For non-medical 
goods and services the major categories are administration, managed care 
and acquisition. The suggested categories offer the benefit of being 
unambiguously mutually exclusive, whilst still providing complete 
coverage of all products considered to be within the scope of the index. 
This structure meets the needs of users of the index. For example, the 
medical categories largely reflect the benefit design structure of medical 
schemes, as well as the delineation of managed care programmes. The 
regulator and DoH will also be interested in groups of practitioners and 
the associated price dynamics (e.g. hospitals).  
The problem with this approach is that there will be situations (with 
new products or bundles of existing products) where a neat fit into a 
category is not possible (ILO, et al., 2004). An example would be capitation 
agreements where a range of goods and services (falling into different 
classes) are provided for a single fee. For now, capitation contracts make 
up a sufficiently small part of medical scheme expenditure to be 
categorised as “other” but in time it may become necessary to create a 
separate category.  
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All the goods and services purchased by medical schemes will need to 
be grouped and classified so that they can be aggregated for the 
compilation of sub-indices. Each claim, that is, each item of medical 
expenditure has a NAPPI code or a tariff code associated with it, as well as 
a practitioner code (reflecting the type of medical provider that submitted 
the claim). The non-medical expenditure is clearly split in medical scheme 
financial statements. 
All pharmaceutical products (excluding surgical products) can be easily 
identified as each item has a NAPPI code associated with it. All items with 
a NAPPI code, other than those dispensed by a hospital, are classified as 
“pharmaceutical”. Items with a NAPPI code that are hospital-dispensed 
are classified as part of hospital expenditure in the Council annual reports. 
All non-pharmaceutical claims can be classified by the claiming provider 
type into hospital, medical specialist, GP, dental and other.   
The pharmaceutical component of the index is based on 
pharmaceutical unit prices, for example, the price per Panado and not per 
pack of Panados. The difficulty with basing the index on unit prices is that, 
unfortunately, not all medical scheme administrators store 9-digit NAPPI 
codes or accurate pack size data. A potential solution to this problem is 
outlined in section 5.6.3. 
The chosen unit of service for hospital expenditure is a hospital event 
because the definition of a hospital event is more likely to be consistent 
across medical schemes than the definition of a hospital day. The use of a 
hospital event as the unit of service also accommodates changes in tariff 
structures over time more easily than the use of a hospital day by making 
it easier to re-price an account. It is suggested that prices only be collected 
from private hospitals (as is done for the CPI) as billing data for public 
hospitals is highly problematic, and medical scheme expenditure in public 
hospitals remains low. Should public sector billing practices improve this 
component of medical scheme expenditure may increase, necessitating 
inclusion in the index.   
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The chosen unit of service for all other medical claims is the NHRPL 
tariff code. For all non-medical items it is proposed that expenditure be 
converted to a per-beneficiary figure. This is debatable given that some 
items (e.g. administration fees) are charged for on a per-member basis. 
5.5. Choice of formula 
The proposed formula takes the form of a price-relative index which, as 
discussed in section 2.4, allows more easily for the construction of sub-
indices and for the analysis of price changes for individual items.   
An annual weight reference period is proposed, and consequently, if 
we are to use any index formula using current weights, publication of the 
index would have to be delayed until after the end of each year. For 
example, the index number for February 2009 could only be published in 
early 2010 when the weights based on the complete 2009 year are 
available. Neither the Paasche formula nor any of the superlative formulae 
are recommended given the resultant delay in publication. 
With a Laspeyres index the weight reference period is equal to the 
price reference period. This would necessitate calculating average prices 
over an annual period, where prices collected on a monthly basis would 
give a clearer pattern of price progression.  
There are two choices of formulae where the weight reference period 
pre-dates the price reference period: the first is a Lowe index (where 
quantities are held constant) and the second is a Young index (where 
expenditure shares are held constant). For products and services with a 
high elasticity of substitution, a Lowe index will exceed a Laspeyres index 
which, in turn, will exceed a Paasche index (ILO, et al., 2004). This 
substitution bias is less of a concern for medical schemes where the third-
party-payer effect would reduce the elasticity of substitution. The 
relationship between a Lowe index and a Young index is less clear, but 
again would depend on substitution elasticity, because expenditure shares 
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are less likely to remain constant if substitution elasticity is high. Any 
concerns about substitution are also mitigated by updating weights more 
frequently (Griliches & Cockburn, 1994). 
A Young index is selected, given that the high-level expenditure shares 
in the annual Council reports appear to remain relatively constant over 
short periods of time. The detailed formula for implementing this is given 
in Appendix A. 
5.6. The weighting structure 
Table 5.1 illustrates the proposed structure of the medical scheme index.  
Tier One (the highest tier), namely the split between medical and non-
medical, and Tier Two, namely the split into the major categories of 
expenditure as per the Council reports, have been discussed already.  
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Table 5.1 Structure of tiers three and four of the index weighting structure 
Tier One and Tier Two Tier Three Tier Four 
1. Medical    
1.1. Hospital Private acute hospitals 
only 
 
Grouped into: day 
cases and in-patient;  
with in-patient cases 
grouped into medical, 
surgical and maternity 
cases  
1.2. Medical Specialist Grouped into 
specialities 
Only a sample of 
medical specialities 
For example: 
1.2.1. Pathologist 
1.2.2. Radiologist 
1.2.3. Anaesthetist 
(A full list can be seen 
in Appendix A) 
Grouped into 
consultations, 
procedures/ 
operations, equipment 
and other 
1.3. Pharmaceutical Pharmacy-dispensed 
only 
Grouped into medicine 
schedule and the 
categories generic, 
original and branded 
1.4. General 
Practitioner 
No grouping Grouped into 
consultations, 
procedures/ 
Operations, 
equipment and other 
1.5. Dental Dentists only  
1.6. Other Grouped into the key  
practitioner types. 
For example: 
1.6.1. Optometrist 
1.6.2. Pharmacist 
1.6.3. Physiotherapist 
(A full list can be seen 
in Appendix A) 
 
2. Non-Medical   
2.1. Administration fee Grouped by 
administrator 
Third-party 
administration fees 
only 
2.2. Managed care fee Grouped by managed 
care organisation 
Fees for key managed 
care services 
2.3. Brokerage fee No grouping No grouping 
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For the lower tiers the categories to be included have been limited to 
simplify the index and data collection. Statistics South Africa (2009), in the 
medical component of CPI, limits both the practitioner types and the items 
included in the basket. 
In the hospital category, public hospitals are excluded and the index 
restricted to only cover acute care facilities (practice codes 57 and 58). The 
excluded categories include day facilities, mental health institutions and 
sub-acute facilities. Private acute care facilities made up 98.3% of medical 
scheme expenditure on hospitals in 2008 (Council for Medical Schemes, 
2009a). 
The South African hospital market is dominated by three large hospital 
groups, namely Life Healthcare, Netcare and Medi-Clinic, who operate 
more than three quarters of acute beds in the private sector (Matsebula & 
Willie, 2007). Each group makes up more than 20% of available private 
beds (Matsebula & Willie, 2007). In addition, the National Hospital 
Network (NHN) acts as a negotiating block for some of the independent 
hospitals. 
Whilst there are also a large number of independent hospitals, it 
makes practical sense to limit the index to the three largest groups and 
NHN to simplify data validation. Medical schemes (or their administrators) 
negotiate separately with each hospital group and with NHN, and 
consequently the level of hospital prices as well as the tariff structures will 
differ between the groups.  
Similarly tariff increases are negotiated separately for each medical 
speciality making it necessary to delineate the index along these lines. 
Expenditure is fairly concentrated with the top 12 specialities constituting 
85% of expenditure in 2008 (Council for Medical Schemes, 2009a).  
It is suggested that the pharmaceutical expenditure be confined to 
that which is pharmacy dispensed. This simplifies the calculation of 
dispensing fees which differ between doctors and pharmacists. 
Pharmacies dispensed 88.5% of pharmaceutical products in 2008 (Council 
for Medical Schemes, 2009a). Ideally separate indices should be created 
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for chronic and acute medication but doing so is complicated by 
differences in benefit design between schemes.  The NAPPI code alone 
does not indicate whether a claim was paid from a chronic medication 
benefit or not, and the same drug can be considered either acute or 
chronic depending on the circumstances under which it was prescribed. 
Creating sub-indices along benefit lines would thus violate the principle of 
each item being unambiguously allocated to a category.    
Dental expenditure is largely generated by dentists and not by dental 
specialists. It is thus proposed that the index be limited to dentists, as is 
done by Statistics South Africa (2009). The suggested weights for each 
category, as well as the estimated coverage of the index are given in 
Appendix A. 
5.6.1. Updating the weights 
It is proposed that the weights for the top tiers of the basket be updated 
less frequently than the lower tiers. The medical scheme sector is 
characterised by rapid change, and consequently, it is proposed that the 
weights for the lower tiers be updated on an annual basis. More frequent 
updates are not possible since weights are based on annual data.  
The disadvantage of changing weights frequently is the resultant loss 
of comparability and consistency over time. To counterbalance this, it is 
suggested that the split between medical and non-medical expenditure 
and the split between broad categories of expenditure be based on data 
available in the Council annual reports, and only be updated every five 
years.   
Keeping these weights constant does not allow for substitution 
between categories of expenditure in the periods before the weights are 
updated, but this is not problematic as substitution between these high 
level categories is unlikely. The problem of expenditure shifting between 
categories of expenditure, and the risk of the resultant savings not being 
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captured, is far more acute at the lower tiers of the index structure. This 
problem is avoided by updating the lower level weights annually. 
Consequently the results of the index will not be highly sensitive to the 
choices of categories. 
The introduction of new weights provides an opportunity for changes 
to the index to be made. Most commonly, re-weighting can be used to 
introduce new goods and services into the index, but from time to time a 
more significant restructuring of the index may be necessary, for example, 
when a new classification of items may become necessary.  
5.6.2. Sampling 
With available computing power it is not necessary to sample. However, 
expenditure does tend to be highly concentrated, and using all items has 
the disadvantage of increasing the number of cases where transaction 
prices are not available in a time period.  
This approach is particularly appealing in the context of sampling 
hospital accounts where the prices of high-cost events are likely to be 
volatile. It is proposed that the sampling of hospital accounts be based on 
both ICD-10 and CPT-4 codes, taking into account both the diagnosis and 
the procedure performed. It should be noted that price variation between 
accounts may still be significant, and ideally the sampling of hospital 
accounts should take into account case mix and severity. For example, 
claims could ideally be grouped using Diagnosis Related Groupings (DRGs). 
However, the methodology currently used to group hospital claims into 
homogeneous groups varies between schemes and hospital groups. 
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5.6.3. Obtaining price data 
In order for a medical price index to be meaningful, transaction prices 
should be used. Whilst obtaining transaction prices may be complicated in 
certain environments (where, for example, transaction data are kept 
private for competitive reasons), medical scheme transaction prices are 
readily available in the form of claims data. Transaction prices will differ 
from list prices where medical schemes have entered into specific 
contractual arrangements with particular providers (as is the case with 
preferred provider networks), and where providers have the freedom to 
charge prices that differ from list prices (for example, in the case of 
Prescribed Minimum Benefits schemes have to reimburse the provider at 
the full price charged). 
Medical scheme claims data will reflect more than one possible 
measure of price. There will be the price the provider charged (often 
referred to as the “account amount”), the price the medical scheme is 
willing to reimburse (often referred to as the “tariff amount”), and the 
price actually reimbursed by the scheme which may be affected by benefit 
limits and cost sharing with the medical scheme member (often referred 
to as the “paid amount”). The ideal price to use would be the tariff 
amount adjusted to reflect cost-sharing arrangements but not benefit 
limits. Where this is not possible the tariff amount is preferable to the paid 
amount. 
List price data (reflecting the SEP) for pharmaceutical products are 
publicly available in the form of price files.  The available price files 
provide a start date and end date for which a price is valid (i.e. prices are 
not published for particular dates). The account amount would reflect this 
list price (as providers are not allowed to charge more or less than the 
SEP), and may or may not include the dispensing fee. The definition of the 
tariff amount might also differ between medical scheme administrators. In 
combining data across administrators it would be necessary to establish 
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whether the tariff amount reflects any reference pricing and whether it 
includes the dispensing fee.  
The notion of a list price does not exist for hospital claims as prices are 
negotiated between schemes (or administrators) and private hospital 
groups, and there is typically no “balance billing” (an amount billed in 
excess of the agreed tariff that is for the beneficiary’s account). For 
hospital claims it is suggested that an account re-pricing methodology be 
used. This method is used by Statistics South Africa (2009) and allows for 
shifts in methods of hospital remuneration over time. The account would 
cover the entire set of services provided during a patient visit, that is, 
ward fees, theatre fees and consumables.  
One of the complexities arising from alternative reimbursement 
contracts is that there may be what is referred to as a “re-work 
difference” at the end of the contract period. This is an amount that is 
retrospectively determined based on claims experience over the period of 
the contract and does not relate to a particular account. Further analysis is 
required to assess the extent of these adjustments.   
The list price for other practitioner types is the NHRPL. Individual 
schemes are encouraged to negotiate tariffs directly with practitioners, 
using the NHRPL as a guideline 
One of the disadvantages of using transaction prices is that there may 
be breaks in the price series if there are months during which particular 
goods or services are not purchased. This problem will arise less 
frequently if prices are used only for a sample of goods and services, and 
the sampling methodology considers the frequency with which a product 
is claimed.  
Where a price is temporarily missing for a product, the product can be 
omitted from the calculation of the index (ILO, et al., 2004). However, this 
requires re-weighting other items in the same category. Alternatively a 
price change can be imputed based on the average price change for other 
products in the same category (ILO, et al., 2004). The circularity of this 
solution is computationally inefficient. Other possible solutions include 
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excluding seasonal items from the basket or introducing the concept of a 
rolling year-on-year index (ILO, et al., 2004). For medical goods and 
services where price changes are not volatile it is also possible to carry the 
last available price forward; this is the approach used in this research.   
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Chapter 6 
6. Results - an illustrative pharmaceutical price 
index 
The methodology proposed in Chapter 5 is applied to pharmaceutical 
expenditure to create a price index for illustrative purposes. For the 
purposes of this illustration, data were obtained from Medscheme Pty 
(Ltd). Medscheme is an accredited medical scheme administrator and 
managed-care company, which in 2008 administered 16 medical schemes 
representing 12.4% of beneficiaries in the market (Council for Medical 
Schemes, 2009a). 
The dataset contained pharmaceutical claims data for years 2006 
through 2009. The transaction price (or tariff amount) for pharmaceutical 
products in this dataset is referred to as the Medscheme Price List (MPL). 
The MPL is a Medscheme-specific implementation of reference pricing, 
where the MPL is usually set at the cost of the second least expensive 
version of the medication in a therapeutic category. The beneficiary is not 
prevented from claiming for a more expensive drug, but the scheme will 
only reimburse the MPL price. The difference between the published list 
price (the SEP) and the MPL is paid by the beneficiary. Pharmaceutical 
product prices can be measured either including or excluding dispensing 
fees. The index was calculated on both bases for illustrative purposes.  
The highly concentrated nature of pharmaceutical expenditure means 
that a high level of coverage can be achieved with a relatively small 
dataset. An analysis of 2008 data indicated that 15.46% of NAPPIs (1534 
products) accounted for 90% of expenditure on acute medication, and 
5.39% of NAPPIs (535 items) accounted for 90% of expenditure on chronic 
medication. However, no sampling was done as Medscheme had the 
computing power available to include all pharmaceutical products. 
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In order to calculate the elementary aggregates an average unit price 
had to be calculated for each product. This was calculated as an un-
weighted average of the unit price for each pack size variation of that 
product. Each pack size has the same price per unit excluding dispensing 
fee, but the unit price including dispensing fee differs because the 
dispensing fee is calculated as a percentage of the total price of the pack.  
Medscheme does not carry 9-digit NAPPI codes and the quality of the 
pack size data field was found to be questionable. The elementary 
aggregates thus had to be based on externally published list price 
information. The list price as at the 15 th of each month was used. Using 
price data on a single date allows price data to be more easily checked, for 
example, on a particular data the SEP should be identical for all schemes. 
However, if the average price over a month is used, and the price changed 
during the course of the month, the average SEP is likely to differ between 
schemes (as the weight of transactions before and after the price change 
will differ). Where the price of a product was limited by MPL the price for 
the reference product was imputed.  
As a result of not using transaction prices, the dispensing fee for each 
pack size had to be calculated using the relevant dispensing fee logic  
because dispensing fees differ by scheme, medicine schedule, whether the 
medicine was dispensed by a pharmacist or doctor and whether a 
designated service provider (DSP) was used or not. Examples of the 
dispensing fees for four schemes are given in Table 6.1. The published list 
price includes VAT, which has to be removed before calculating the 
dispensing fee. 
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Table 6.1 Examples of dispensing fees (November 2009) 
  Pharmacy dispensed Doctor dispensed 
Scheme 
Schedule 
0 
Schedule 
<> 0 DSP 
Schedule 
0 
Schedule 
<> 0 DSP 
A 20% 
26% to a 
max of 
R26 
 
20% 
30% to a 
max of 
R20 (incl 
VAT) 
 
B 20% 
26% to a 
max of 
R26 
20% to a 
max of 
R20 
20% 
30% to a 
max of 
R20 (incl 
VAT) 
20% to a 
max of 
R20 
C 36% 36% 
20% to a 
max of 
R20 for 
chronic; 
else 26% 
to a max 
of R26 
36% 
30% to a 
max of 
R20 (incl 
VAT) 
20% to a 
max of 
R20 for 
chronic; 
else 26% 
to a max 
of R26 
D 
26% not 
less than 
R15.00 
(excl 
VAT) 
26% not 
less than 
R15.00 
(excl 
VAT) 
 
36% 
30% to a 
max of 
R20 (incl 
VAT) 
 
Source: Medscheme 
 
Using published list prices also dealt with the problem of temporarily 
missing price information, where an item is not claimed in a particular 
month. Prices were imputed for discontinued products, using the last 
known price, for the remainder of the year until the basket was updated.  
The expenditure shares were determined using the calculated average 
unit prices for each product multiplied with the quantities demanded of 
each product. In other words, the expenditure shares were not based on 
the actual expenditure on each product as this would have been skewed 
by changes in the mix of pack sizes dispensed over time.  
The index reference period for the index was taken as January 2006. 
The price reference period was January of each year (in this case 2006 to 
2009, inclusive). No allowance needed to be made for the claims to be 
fully run-off because the claim processing for pharmaceutical products is 
largely real-time. The prices were updated monthly, and the weights 
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updated annually. The weight reference period was the year preceding the 
price reference period.  
The price indices calculated using the four possible measures of price 
(SEP excluding dispensing fee, SEP including dispensing fee, MPL excluding 
dispensing fee and MPL including dispensing fee) can be seen in Figure 
6.1. The overall pattern of price changes is as expected; increases are 
concentrated in the months where the Department of Health published 
the maximum permitted increases to SEP. As expected, the MPL increases 
more slowly than the SEP; this is a feature of the MPL being benchmarked 
to the second cheapest drug in a category. The MPL is updated as drug 
prices change, so if the benchmark product increased in price so as to be 
more expensive than other products in the same category, the MPL would 
be updated to reflect a new benchmark. 
 
 
Figure 6.1 Pharmaceutical price indices reflecting alternative definitions of price  
 
The weights for generic, original and branded products remained fairly 
stable over time, as illustrated in Figure 6.2. 
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Figure 6.2 Expenditure shares for generic, original and branded products (2006-2009) 
 
The expenditure shares were checked against Mediscor data 
(Mediscor, 2009) to assess the extent to which the Medscheme dataset is 
representative of the market. The comparison can be seen in Figure 6.3. It 
was found that generic use was slightly higher in each year in the 
Medscheme dataset. The use of branded and original products differed 
significantly with branded products having a greater representation in the 
Medscheme basket. 
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Figure 6.3 Comparison of expenditure shares for generic, original and branded products  
 
From Figure 6.4 it can be seen that the extent of generic use varies 
significantly per benefit category, and the increases in the use of generics 
per category were substantial. However, a change in the mix of benefit 
categories over time resulted in a fairly muted overall increase. 
 
 
Figure 6.4 Expenditure shares for generic products per benefit category (2006 and 2009) 
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From the results for the generic, original and branded product sub-
indices it is clear that the price development for these three categories of 
products is different (see Figure 6.5). Whilst the prices of generic products 
are lower, it was surprising to find that the prices of generics increased 
more rapidly than the prices of original and branded products. It is not 
surprising that the prices of original products rise the most slowly; these 
products have to compete with their generic equivalents (branded 
products still have patent protection). 
 
 
 
Figure 6.5 Pharmaceutical price indices for brand, original and generic pharmaceutical products  
 
The results were checked against figures published by Mediscor  
(Mediscor, 2009). The Mediscor price index is based on changes in the 
SEP, excluding dispensing fees. The Mediscor price changes were found to 
be lower for all three categories; however the relationship between price 
changes for the three categories were found to be similar with original 
products increasing at a lower rate than generic and branded products. As 
discussed in section 2.9.2 the detail of the methodology used by Mediscor 
is not available and comparisons should be interpreted with caution.   
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As beneficiaries switch to generic products over time the expenditure 
weights will change to reflect a greater proportion of the expenditure 
share going to generic products. Consequently the index will reflect the 
change in the price of generic products to a greater extent. However, the 
overall index does not capture price differences between an original 
product and the generic version of that product and would thus overstate  
price changes.  
The expenditure shares for each medicine schedule were found to 
change quite significantly over time. The proportion of expenditure on 
schedule 0 drugs doubled from 2006 to 2009. Comparable figures were 
not available in the Mediscor report and it was thus not possible to assess 
the extent to which the expenditure shares based on the Medscheme 
dataset are representative.  
 
 
Figure 6.6 Expenditure share per medicine schedule (2006-2009) 
 
The sub indices based on the medicine schedule appear to provide a 
useful basis for categorising pharmaceutical products. The results in Figure 
6.7 indicate significant differences between schedules. In particular, 
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Mediscor results also reveal a significantly higher increase for schedule 0 
drugs. 
 
 
Figure 6.7 Pharmaceutical price indices per medicine schedule  
 
Sub indices were also created for the different benefit categories 
(acute, chronic, over-the-counter, oncology and HIV). Schemes are likely 
to be interested in seeing the categories of expenditure separately 
because they differ in terms of financial importance, are subject to 
different levels of managed care intervention, and they are reported on 
separately in other contexts, for example, in managed care reports. 
The expenditure shares for each of the categories can be seen in 
Figure 6.8. The shares were stable for the major categories (acute and 
chronic) but shifts in the other categories did occur over time. In 
particular, the proportion of expenditure going to over-the-counter 
medication increased from 7% in 2006 to 13% in 2009.  
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Figure 6.8 Expenditure shares per benefit category 
 
The expenditure shares were checked against Mediscor data 
(Mediscor, 2009); the comparison can be seen in Figure 6.9. Given that 
benefit categorisation is based on the benefit design of the schemes in the 
dataset, comparability between schemes and administrators is anticipated 
to be low. As expected, the splits between benefit categories in the 
Medscheme dataset and the Mediscor data were found to be significantly 
different.  
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Figure 6.9 Comparison of expenditure shares for benefit categories  
 
Despite the difficulties associated with using benefit categorisation, 
from the results in Figure 6.10 it can be seen that there are differences in 
price changes, particularly for HIV pharmaceuticals.  
 
 
 
Figure 6.10 Pharmaceutical price indices per benefit category 
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Chapter 7 
7. Discussion and conclusions 
The aim of this research was to propose a methodology for constructing a 
price index reflecting the experience of medical schemes in South Africa. 
The only other methodology, based on local private sector data, reflects 
the experience of medical scheme beneficiaries and not of medical 
schemes themselves (Da Silva, 2007). The work done is thus a first attempt 
to address the need for a medical scheme price index. 
The advantage of looking at it from the perspective of beneficiaries is 
that a comparison with the medical component of the consumer price 
index is more meaningful. However, there are two disadvantages. The first 
is that by using medical scheme data, only a partial view of the 
beneficiary’s experience of medical prices can be obtained. Out-of-pocket 
expenditure is only taken into account to the extent that claims are 
submitted, but not fully reimbursed. Out-of-pocket expenditure for 
medical scheme beneficiaries is significant and does vary extensively 
between categories of expenditure; consequently, the weights obtained 
for the various categories of expenditure can be expected to differ. 
The second is that it is not clear who the key user of the index would 
be. Medical schemes themselves would presumably be more concerned 
with the prices they experience, and medical scheme beneficiaries would 
be concerned with their overall health expenditure, which can be viewed 
as being the sum of their medical scheme contributions and their out-of-
pocket expenditure. 
The proposed index is based on data collected from the six largest 
medical scheme administrators. Purposive sampling using administrators 
to provide clusters of medical scheme data increases the ease of data 
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collection and data cleaning, particularly since the data capturing and 
quality is likely to vary between administrators. 
The proposed methodology needs to be tested on a more complete 
dataset. The methodology was only tested on pharmaceutical data, and 
this was based on data from one medical scheme administrator, namely 
Medscheme. The  Medscheme data was checked against Mediscor (2009) 
data to ascertain whether it was representative. Deviations between the 
two data sources were observed and problems relating to differences in 
benefit category definitions were identified. 
The work done by Da Silva (2007) was also based on data from a single 
administrator. Given that administrators (and managed care companies) 
impact on the prices experienced by their clients, for example, by 
negotiating with providers on their behalf, results are likely to be biased. 
In addition data quality is likely to vary by administrator, making the 
creation of a dataset that is more representative of the industry essential.  
Unfortunately, the creation of an industry-wide dataset is a time-
consuming and resource-intensive endeavour. As discussed in the 
introduction there are a number of potential uses for such an index, and it 
is suggested that the relevant stakeholders be approached to facilitate 
data collection. The regulator, in particular, should be enlisted to 
encourage scheme participation. A closer working relationship with 
Statistics South Africa is also likely to be fruitful given the increasing 
reliance on the private sector for price data and the significant 
methodological advances made by the agency in recent years. 
It should be noted that medical scheme data are not likely, on their 
own, to be suitable for the purpose of constructing a consumer medical 
price index as medical schemes cover only 15.84% of the population 
(Council for Medical Schemes, 2009b; Statistics South Africa, 2008b) and 
the population covered by medical schemes is not representative of the 
population at large in a number of respects, inter alia income, age and  
geographical distribution (McLeod & Ramjee, 2007). By virtue of having 
access to medical cover, medical scheme beneficiaries are likely to make 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
Of
 C
ap
e T
ow
n 
99 
 
use of more expensive medical goods and services. Lastly, the prices paid 
by medical scheme patients may differ from those paid by non-medical 
scheme patients. 
The weighting structure proposed for a medical scheme index is 
hierarchical, with the weights for the top tiers of the basket (the split 
between medical and non-medical, and subsequently between major 
categories of expenditure such as hospital and pharmaceutical) updated 
every five years based on data in the Council annual reports.  
Items are classified into the lower tiers according to a product-based 
classification system and it is suggested that the weights for these tiers be 
updated annually. All weights should be based on expenditure over a year 
to deal with seasonal effects on expenditure patterns. The index proposed 
by Da Silva (2007) used weights that were based on expenditure over a 
three-year period. Weights based on annual data have the advantage of 
more closely reflecting recent expenditure patterns. Weighting over a 
longer period will also tend to underweight new goods and services. 
It is suggested that not all categories of items and practitioners be 
included in the index to simplify the computation. However, the 
advantage of a sector-focussed index, as opposed to an economy-wide 
index like CPI, is that a larger set of items can be covered. The sample size 
of items to include in the index would depend on the computational 
power available for compiling the index and the sampling methodology 
would be proportional (based on expenditure) with very high-cost, low-
frequency items being excluded. The work done on creating a 
pharmaceutical index revealed that expenditure on pharmaceutical 
products is highly concentrated.  
A Dutot index is proposed for calculating the elementary aggregates, 
and a Young index at the higher levels of aggregation. Statistics South 
Africa (2009) uses a Young index, whilst Da Silva (2007) describes the index 
used as a chained-linked Laspeyres. The index would be published 
monthly and chain-linked when weights are updated. It is proposed that 
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the index be calculated separately for open schemes, restricted 
membership schemes and the industry as a whole. 
Where possible, transaction prices should be used to increase the 
accuracy of the index. For pharmaceutical prices list price data are 
required to calculate accurately unit prices, as was illustrated in Chapter 6. 
The Da Silva (2007) index used prices per pack and not unit prices; the 
disadvantage of this approach is that the index will reflect changes in the 
mix of pack sizes sold and not just changes in the unit price. Using the 
example of a pack of Panados: if the price per Panado remains unchanged 
but purchasing patterns change (so that people switch from packs of 20 
Panados to packs of 30 Panados) the index will reflect a price increase 
where none has occurred.  
The medical scheme price data can also be supplemented by data from 
providers. For example, it is proposed that hospital prices be based on a 
sample of accounts obtained directly from the major hospital groups. 
Statistics South Africa (Kelly, 2009) uses a similar methodology. Whilst 
there are some technical difficulties associated with re-pricing accounts, 
the method is an effective means of allowing for changes in 
reimbursement methods over time, as well as providing some allowance 
for changes in technology.  
The proposed methodology goes some of the way to addressing the 
commonly-arising biases in price indices. Price indices based on historical 
weights are exposed to the risk of substitution bias. Substitution bias is 
unlikely to be of major concern in the medical scheme context given that 
medical scheme beneficiaries tend to have low levels of price sensitivity 
due to agency problems, information asymmetry and third-party-payer 
effects. There are some areas of expenditure where medical schemes are 
able to strongly influence purchasing decisions (for example, by using 
reference pricing and formularies for pharmaceutical products), and in 
these areas of expenditure there is the possibility of a historically 
weighted price index being biased upward. Further work is required to 
determine the elasticity of substitution for medical schemes. 
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To the extent that substitution bias does exist, the proposed updating 
of weights annually reduces the bias. The decision to update weights 
annually is supported by the results in Chapter 6 where it can be seen that 
expenditure shares do change from year to year.  
A Young index formula (based on historical expenditure share weights) 
was proposed to deal with the seasonal effects in medical scheme 
expenditure as it allows for both weights based on annual data and the 
timeous publication of the index. 
The availability of medical scheme claims data obviates the need for 
outlet sampling to obtain price data. Transaction prices can be determined 
directly from the claims data, and these prices would reflect the actual mix 
of providers utilised in each category. This eliminates any potential for 
outlet substitution bias, which would arise if the index did not reflect the 
price savings incurred as a result of medical scheme beneficiaries 
switching to lower-cost providers. Such switching may occur if, for 
example, a medical scheme implemented a preferred-provider network. 
Consumer price indices are susceptible to new product bias because 
weights are updated infrequently. This is particularly problematic in a 
sector which experiences rapid technological change such as the health 
care sector. This is addressed in the proposed methodology by updating 
weights on an annual basis, allowing new products to be incorporated into 
the index more frequently. The index can be improved by introducing a 
mechanism for capturing price changes between original drugs and 
generics. If new products are introduced that do not fall neatly into the 
proposed index categories the weighting structure of the index will need 
to be changed. 
Bias arising from quality changes has not been addressed at all, largely 
because the interplay between medical care, health and utility is 
exceedingly complex. This presents a significant opportunity for further 
research.  
Considerable further work needs to be done in order to refine and test 
the methodology. The proposed methodology also needs to be tested for 
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the other sub-indices, in particular to assess whether the proposed units 
of service, elementary aggregation and hierarchical structures are optimal. 
Episode groupers are still in their infancy in the South African medical 
scheme market. Given that they provide a clinically meaningful unit of 
analysis it is anticipated that their use will become more widespread in 
future. The use of episodes of care will enhance the accuracy of a price 
index by allowing for changes in technology and quality, thus the 
methodology should be adapted as the use of episode groupers becomes 
standardised. The testing of alternative methodological choices (for 
example, the choice of formula) on a more complete dataset is likely to 
yield interesting insights.  
Comparing results for different medical schemes will provide insights 
into the effects of rationing on price increases over time, and the extent to 
which managed care organisations are effective at managing price. The 
basket of goods and services purchased will differ between schemes. The 
effect of the basket on price change can be computed by calculating the 
index based on industry weights and on individual scheme weights.   
Particular areas were neglected in the proposed methodology and 
thus require further work. As already mentioned, the extent of changes in 
quality was not considered. In addition, work needs to be done on 
developing an appropriate method for grouping hospital claims. Such 
research can be done in conjunction with the private hospital groups who, 
in the process of implementing alternative reimbursement arrangements, 
have engaged with this issue already. 
A deeper understanding of how medical scheme beneficiaries respond 
to price changes, and whether price substitution and outlet substitution 
do occur would serve to further understanding of the likely extent of bias 
in the index.  
The proposed methodology can be extended to consider the price 
changes experienced by medical scheme beneficiaries. This would build on 
the work done by Da Silva (2007) to include out-of-pocket expenditure for 
people with medical scheme cover. Medical scheme data can be used to 
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determine transaction prices (using the account amount) but data would 
have to be collected to determine the expenditure weights for out-of-
pocket expenditure.  
The creation of a medical scheme contribution index would be of 
interest to the regulator and would allow an exploration of the differences 
between prices experienced by medical schemes and the price to 
consumers of medical scheme cover. This extension would also be of 
interest to Statistics South Africa as they include the price of medical 
scheme cover in the Consumer Price Index. 
The results for the pharmaceutical price index are pleasing in that they 
reflect the expected price dynamics over the period. The relationships 
between the different categories of products are as expected. Ideally the 
results should be compared to other available figures but this is not 
possible either because it is not clear what the methodological differences 
are (as with the Mediscor and Medikredit indices) or because the 
methodological differences are too great for a comparison to be 
meaningful (as with the Statistics South Africa index and the Da Silva 
index). 
This research has revealed an under-explored area of work and opens 
up numerous avenues for further investigation. In addition, the medical 
sector is innovative and will continue to evolve rapidly and the proposed 
index methodology will need to respond to these changes. 
It is hoped that the potential uses of such an index are evident and 
that both medical scheme administrators and the regulator are motivated 
to collaborate on establishing a more comprehensive dataset to enable 
further research to take place. 
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Appendix A 
Given the number of terms involved the formulation the computational equations are presented structurally summarised. The first tier 
is presented in full, while only a single term has been expanded for tiers two, three and four. The full formulation involves the expansion 
of each of the terms as outlined in Table A.1 in a similar way. The table also provides the proportion of expenditure for the time period 
2008. 
 
 
Tier One 
 
 
where: 
 
 
 is the price of the medical goods and services basket at time  
 is the price of the non-medical goods and services basket at time  
 is the quantity of medical goods and services consumed at time  
 is the quantity of non-medical goods and services consumed at time  
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Tier Two 
 
 
where: 
 
 is the price of the basket of a particular category of tier-two medical goods and services at time  
 is the quantity of a particular category of tier-two medical goods and services consumed at  
 denotes the particular category of tier-two medical goods and services under consideration, where  takes on the value of one of the 
following: 
  denotes hospital goods and services 
  denotes medical specialist goods and services 
  denotes pharmaceutical goods and services 
  denotes general practitioner goods and services 
  denotes dental goods and services 
  denotes other goods and services 
 
Tier Three 
 
 
where: 
 
 is the price of the basket of a particular category of tier-three medical goods and services at time  
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 is the quantity of a particular category of tier-three medical goods and services consumed at time  
 denotes the particular category of tier-three medical goods and services under consideration, where  takes on the value of one of 
the following: 
  denotes Life Healthcare 
  denotes Medi-Clinic 
  denotes Netcare 
 
 
Tier Four 
 
 
where: 
 
 is the price of the basket of a particular category of tier-four medical goods and services at time  
 is the quantity of a particular category of tier-four medical goods and services consumed at time  
 denotes the particular category of tier-four medical goods and services under consideration, where  takes on the value of one of the 
following: 
 denotes day cases 
  denotes in-patient medical cases 
  denotes in-patient surgical cases 
  denotes in-patient maternity cases 
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Table A.1 Expenditure weights based on 2008 industry data 
 
Tier One Tier One 
Expenditure 
Weights 
Tier Two Tier Two 
Expenditure 
Weights 
Tier Three Tier Three 
Expenditure 
Weights 
Coverage 
Medical 85.7% Hospital 40.9% Life Healthcare 34.7% 74.7% 
    Medi-Clinic 30.5%  
    Netcare 26.4%  
     100.0%  
  Medical Specialist 21.9% Pathologist 22.0% 84.9% 
    Radiologist 22.0%  
    Anaesthetist 10.8%  
    Physician 6.5%  
    Orthopaedic surgeon 6.5%  
    Otorhinolaryngologist 6.5%  
    Surgeon 5.9%  
    Gynaecologist 5.4%  
    Ophthalmologist 4.8%  
    Paediatrician 4.3%  
    Cardiology 2.7%  
    Psychiatrist 2.7%  
     100.0%  
  Pharmaceutical 15.6%   88.5% 
  General Practitioner 7.4%   100.0% 
  Dental 2.8%   78.6% 
  Other 11.4% Optometrist 27.6% 50.9% 
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    Pharmacist 19.0%  
    Physiotherapist 19.0%  
    Medical technologist 19.0%  
    Radiotherapist 15.5%  
     100.0%  
   100.0%    
Non-medical 14.30% Administration fee 69.2% Discovery 34.9% 76.80% 
    Medscheme 16.1%  
    Metropolitan Health  28.4%  
    Old Mutual 
Healthcare 
8.1%  
    Momentum 5.7%  
    Full Circle Health 3.5%  
    Sechaba  3.3%  
     100.0%  
  Managed care fee 17.5%   100.0% 
  Acquisition 11.9%   100.0% 
  Other 1.4%   0.0% 
   100.0%    
TOTAL 100.0%      
OVERALL 
COVERAGE 
     79.0% 
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